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Abstract
My dissertation discusses information problems encountered by dictators
and voters. In the first essay titled Media with Reputational Concerns: Yes
Men or Watchdogs? I consider why the media tend to endorse the gov-
ernment instead of reporting critically. Traditionally this is explained by
media capture or the policy bias of the media. Analyzing a cheap-talk
model, I suggest that the media outlets reputational concerns can on its
own cause such media behaviour. This is true even when the media out-
lets are on average believed to be more competent than the government,
and when the media market is perfectly competitive.
In the second essay titled Tell Me the Truth? Dictatorship and the Commit-
ment to Media Freedom (jointly with Hans H. Tung and Wen-Chin Wu),
we formally show that the dictator faces a commitment problem to up-
hold a promised level of media freedom. Anticipating the threat after
truth-reporting, the media might self-censor their reports in advance. The
dictator thus suffers from information insufficiency. This paper further
characterizes the situations when the commitment problem is more severe
and provides empirical implications that can help reinterpret the recent
conclusion on the censorship strategy of the Chinese government, in par-
ticular, King, Roberts and Pan (2013).
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In the third essay titled Reputation and Media Selection, by applying the ana-
lytic framework proposed by Tadelis (1999, 2002) that reputation is a trad-
able asset, I argue that providing reputational information about media
outlets to the public, a commonly recommended remedy for addressing
low-quality reporting, might not be effective because of the possibility of
media ownership transactions. Low-quality editorial teams can survive
by acquiring names from reputable newspapers through acquisitions or
mergers. I discuss potential institutional and governmental interventions
that could improve social welfare once introduced along with provision of
media reputational information.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three essays discussing some information problems en-
countered by dictators and voters, i.e., whether they can obtain valuable information
from the media. In the first essay titled Media with Reputational Concerns: Yes Men
or Watchdogs?, I consider why the media tend to endorse the government instead of
reporting critically. Traditionally this is explained by media capture or the policy bias
of the media. Analyzing a cheap-talk model, I suggest that the media outlets’ reputa-
tional concerns can be an important factor to explain such media behavior. Because a
news report does not only indicate the quality of the government but also reflect that
of the media outlet, endorsing government decisions usually improves the reputation
of the media outlet. This is true even when the media outlets are on average believed
to be more competent than the government, and when the media market is perfectly
competitive. As a result, when the government is considered to be reasonably com-
petent, the public is unlikely to obtain useful information from the media. Moreover,
the model shows that when the quality gap between the high- and low-quality media
outlets is widened, the probability of having truthful reporting decreases.
The second essay titled Tell Me the Truth? Dictatorship and the Commitment to Media
Freedom (jointly with Hans H. Tung and Wen-Chin Wu) formalizes a more detailed
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censorship procedure than those analyzed by the existing literature. In the litera-
ture, researchers assume that the media will truthfully report information whenever
a dictator allows media freedom. However, this assumption is rather unrealistic con-
sidering that the constitutions of many authoritarian regimes guarantee freedom of
speech, but censorship prevails. In our framework, a dictator can always censor and
punish media outlets that report inconvenient truths after news is uncovered but be-
fore it is publicized. Studying this important phase in censorship, we show that the
dictator faces a commitment problem to uphold a promised level of media freedom.
Anticipating the threat after truth-reporting, the media might self-censor their reports
in advance. The dictator thus suffers from information insufficiency. Importantly,
censorship and self-censorship yield very different welfare outcomes to the dictator.
The dictator learns the information before censorship, but does not learn that if it is
self-censored by the media outlet. This paper characterizes the situations when the
commitment problem is more severe. For example, when the society is rather stable,
the dictator does not need to rely on positive news from credible media to diffuse
public dissents, and hence has less incentive to commit to media freedom. It turns
out that the dictator’s information problem is more severe when in a stable society
than when in a rather volatile one. Finally, this analysis provides empirical impli-
cations that can help reinterpret the recent conclusion on the censorship strategy of
the Chinese government, in particular, King, Roberts and Pan (2013). We argue that
attempting to infer the censorship strategy of the Chinese government by looking at
the observed data could be problematic due to the missing data problem resulting
from self-censorship.
In the third essay titled Reputation and Media Selection, I evaluate whether provision
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of reputational information about media outlets to the public could be a promising
remedy for addressing low-quality reporting. With respect to the prevalence of low-
quality news reporting, many suggest that if news consumers are provided with in-
formation about the quality of media outlets, they can avoid fabricated information by
choosing media outlets wisely. It is also believed that reputational information could
encourage quality reporting. The underlying logic is that if the public can monitor the
performance of media outlets, then the media outlets with reputational concerns can
be incentivized to produce high-quality reports. I analyze a media market and assess
whether knowing the past performance of newspapers can help the readers to avoid
low-quality journalism by applying the framework proposed by Tadelis (1999, 2002)
that reputation is a tradable asset. I show that provision of reputational information
per se could not eliminate low-quality journalism, and could instead create a subtle
opportunity for information manipulation through media ownership. The analysis
provides a new theoretical perspective arguing for regulations on media market aim-
ing at preserving pluralism.
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Chapter 2
Media with Reputational Concerns:
Yes Men or Watchdogs?
2.1 Introduction
Information is essential for the electorate to assess the quality of their government.
Among all information sources, the media is primary. At the same time, media out-
lets also care about their reputations. Indeed, almost all media outlets claim that
they are able to gather more—and more accurate—information than other media
outlets. However, when popular opinion of a government is not too low, media out-
lets endorse government decisions instead of reporting critical opinions. Despite the
principles of watchdog journalism being widely accepted in democracies, journalists
do not always follow them (Boydstun, 2013; Norris, 2014).
This lack of independent and critical reporting could be an especially significant
issue in areas in which the government is believed to have no strong partisan bias
but have access to secret information. A classic example is the media coverage of the
Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964, which was the basis for President Johnson ordering
a retaliatory action against North Vietnam. In 1964, the U.S. media did not challenge
the government but reported the incident as fact. Yet, in 2007, when classified in-
formation on the incident was made public following a Freedom of Information Act
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request, the public finally learned that this attack was imaginary. This cannot be ex-
plained by lack of accessible information alone. In a seminal book about this event,
Hallin (1986) asserts that “[government] control of information by itself, however, by
no means explains the effectiveness of their efforts. There was, in fact, a great deal of
information available which contradicted the official account; it simply wasn’t used”
(p. 31). He considers the fact that the French newspaper Le Monde reported a story
on the incident very different from those of the U.S. news outlets as evidence of the
media’s access to (non-reported) information.1 Indeed, there are also many similar
discussions surrounding, for example, the contemporary Iraq War.
In the political economy literature, explanations about the conformist reporting
include “grabbing hand” (for example, Besley and Prat, 2006)—suggesting that the
government may use its power to intervene in media reporting—and also include
the political motives of media owners (for example, Larcinese et al., 2011; Anderson
and McLaren, 2012). This paper argues that neither of these conditions is necessary.
Instead, a media outlet may report untruthfully solely because of its reputational
concerns. Using a game theoretical model, I show that a reputation-concerned media
outlet usually refrains from truthfully reporting information. Instead of carrying out
its role as a watchdog, a media outlet tends to act as a yes man,2 which means it
endorses the government’s decisions despite possessing contradictory information.
With access to only yes-man reports, the public cannot acquire relevant information
about the government’s competence.
1This is not saying that the U.S. public should have believed in a French newspaper or other foreign
media more than the American ones, but because the issue was less salient in France than in the United
States, the French media outlet was subject to less reputational concerns and was able to transmit its
information without the same level of strategic consideration as its U.S. counterparts.
2Prendergast (1993) is probably the first to study the “yes man” behavior. Prendergast (1993)
shows that when firms use subjective performance evaluation, workers have an incentive to cater to
the opinion of their managers.
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This paper analyzes a game with three actors: the government, the media out-
let, and the representative voter. The government makes a decision to implement a
policy. Following the policy decision, the media outlet reports the information about
it to the voter. In order to decide whether to retain the incumbent, the voter wants
to determine the competence of the government from both the observed policy deci-
sion and the media report. However, the news report also reveals information about
the quality of the media outlet, so the voter forms opinions not only about the gov-
ernment but also about the media outlet by Bayesian updating. The media outlet
that is concerned about its own reputation thus has to make its reporting decision
strategically.
With this model, I first consider the case when a single media outlet is the only
source of information for the voter. The model shows that the media outlet never
truthfully reports information because of its reputational concerns. The intuition is
that when there is no other source of information that can reveal yes-man behavior, it
is always beneficial for the media outlet to endorse the government’s decision because
doing so never decreases the media outlet’s reputation: When the reader believes
that the media outlet is reporting truthfully, a report matching the government policy
improves its reputation. On the other hand, a report conflicting the government
policy does not improve the media outlet’s reputation since either the policy decision
or the report can be wrong.
I next study the general case, in which the voter can also possibly receive a perfect
signal from other sources of information. For example, the voter can receive infor-
mation from foreign media or a natural disaster may take place that reveals the truth
of low-quality governance. The analysis shows that, with the imperfect feedback, the
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media outlet becomes more likely to report truthfully. However, the conditions for
a truthful reporting equilibrium to occur are still restrictive: The government has to
be considered incompetent and the probability of the exogenous revelation has to be
high. Otherwise, endorsing the government’s decision usually yields higher reputa-
tion for the media outlet. This means, in general, that the voter is unlikely to acquire
truthful information about the quality of the government from media reports. It is
particularly true when the government is expected to be reasonably competent be-
cause in this case, an incompetent media outlet has a higher incentive to pander to
the government policy in its reporting in order to maximize the probability of being
correct. To have a truthful reporting equilibrium, two conditions must hold simul-
taneously: The expected competence of the government is sufficiently low, and the
probability for the voter to learn from other information sources is sufficiently high.
Because media outlets in this model care only about reputation, do not have po-
litical agendas, and are not under the threat of media capture, the setup can be con-
sidered the most likely case for independent reporting. Importantly, the yes-man
problem persists even when the electorate will know with certainty the true state ex
post, as well as when there exist multiple media outlets. The results also hold when
the media outlet cares not only about reputation but ideology.
The paper proceeds as follows. I first relate this topic to the existing literature.
Then, I introduce the model and analyze the conditions for the existence of a truthful
reporting equilibrium and present comparative statics in the case of one media outlet.
I further analyze the cases when the media outlet is also concerned about political
ideology and when there exist multiple media outlets. I then conclude the paper. All
proofs are presented in the appendix.
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2.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to the literature of strategic media reporting, media reputational
concerns, and media’s incumbency bias, particularly Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006)
and Ashworth and Shotts (2010). This paper is connected more generally with the
literature of strategic information transmission.
Because the electorate relies on media reports to learn information for political
selection and to discipline politicians, there is a natural concern about the quality of
the reports. Besley (2005) remarks that “the media can assist voters in identifying
the quality of candidates and conversely, political selection will often work poorly
in countries where the media is repressed” (p. 56). Chiang and Knight (2011) show
empirically that endorsements from newspapers are influential in voters’ decisions,
but the level of influence is conditioned on the perceived credibility of the media.
Bruns and Himmler (2016) consider a model in which the media outlet is a profit
maximizer, showing that voters are willing to incentivize the media to report valuable
information in order to hold politicians accountable. Politicians also respond to the
media environment of a society (Wolton, 2019).
However, this paper is one of several that argues that the media may fail to deliver
on its promise of competency and truthfulness. In particular, a media outlet that
wants to be regarded as high-quality may conceal information that endangers its
reputation.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) show that media reports tend to pander toward
voters’ prior beliefs to build their reputations. In this paper, I show that, to bolster
its reputation, a media outlet may become a yes man to the government. The two
papers are similar in three ways: (1) the interim belief for the voter of what is the true
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policy (depending on the believed competence of the government) is similar to the
prior in the model; (2) both papers characterize pandering reporting equilibrium of
media outlets; (3) both papers show that availability of feedback and competition be-
tween media market can induce truthful reporting. However, the pandering behavior
characterized in the present paper is different from that in Gentzkow and Sharpiro
(2006). With a richer policy space adopted from Caillaud and Tirole (2002), instead of
a binary policy choice, a competent media outlet does not always have an incentive to
report truthfully (which is assumed in Gentzkow and Sharpiro, 2006), and the media
outlet does not always report truthfully even when the voter receives feedback with
certainty. My analysis further shows the upper limit of the competition effect: Even
when there are an infinite number of media outlets, the existence of a truthful report-
ing equilibrium is not guaranteed. Hence the present paper shows the existence of a
more substantial yes-man problem of the media when the policy option is not binary.
In terms of the media’s reputational incentive, this paper focuses on media’s rep-
utation for competence; previous research has considered reputation for neutrality.
Shapiro (2016) argues that a media outlet that wants to be viewed as unbiased may
not report the full set of facts to the voter, and, thus, the voter can only form an
ambiguous impression about the debate even when there is a clear consensus among
experts. Morris (2001) suggests that an information provider may conceal information
in order to be considered as unbiased.
Ashworth and Shotts (2010) discuss whether informative media commentary can
help solve the problem of a government choosing to implement a popular, but in-
correct, policy even when the policy-maker does know that this is not the correct
decision. Their model shows that sometimes, a media report makes the problem of
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pandering worse, especially when the media outlet acts as a yes man. This paper is
closely related to Ashworth and Shotts (2010), but there are at least two significant
differences: (1) This paper shows that the media outlet may act as a yes man even
when it is more competent than the government, and (2) this model allows analysis
of media competition, as well as of cases with various other information sources.
The media’s reputational concerns thus lead to yes-man behavior, and media re-
ports tend to be biased in favor of the incumbent government. In the political econ-
omy literature, there are other explanations of conformist reporting. A prominent
explanation, “grabbing hand,” suggests that the government may use power to in-
tervene into media reporting. Besley and Prat (2006) and Gehlbach and Sonin (2014)
belong to this strand. By contrast, Baron (2006), Larcinese et al. (2011), and Anderson
and McLaren (2012) explain the existence of incumbency bias by political motives of
media owners.
In the political communication literature, many studies aim to explain the lack of
independent reports by “indexing theory” (Bennett, 1990); that is, the news coverage
reflects the range of views that exists within the government. If there is a consensus
within the government, there will be few critical reports, and non-official views are
not covered (Zaller and Chiu, 1996). Hallin (1986) suggests that patriotism or princi-
ples of professional journalism led news outlets to conceal some information during
wartime. Althaus et al. (1996) suggest that the norm of objectivity that encourages
journalists to present conflict and balance in debate may contribute to the overem-
phasis on a one-sided elite voice. Boydstun (2013) explains why media cover some
issues in detail but not others by the competition for attention across issues depend-
ing on the nature of the stories, along with a range of institutional incentives, such
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as policy-maker attention and public concern. Selective reporting across issues is an
important research topic but beyond the scope of this paper.
In this paper, media reporting is cheap talk, and, thus, this paper is connected
with the literature of strategic information transmission that begins with Crawford
and Sobel (1982). It is especially close to Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006), who discuss
a reputation-concerned expert using a cheap-talk message to signal its quality to the
evaluator. Unlike most cheap talk models, the media outlet in this paper is policy-
wise unbiased. Nevertheless, due to the media outlet’s reputational concerns, its
report might still not reveal the truth to the voter.
2.3 The Model
Players There are three players in this model: a government G, a media outlet M
and a voter V. The government G and the media outlet M are either competent h or
incompetent l. The type of the government (τG = J) and the type of the media outlet
(τM = J), where J ∈ {h, l}, are each organizations private information. It is common
knowledge, however, that Pr(τG = h) = p and Pr(τM = h) = q. The competent
actors are more likely to learn the true state of the world than are the incompetent
actors.
Policy Choice and Media Report Following the setup of Caillaud and Tirole (2002),
the government chooses a policy x from an infinite number of policy choices. Among
them, only one unique policy is correct, meaning that only one policy matches the
true state of the world ω, which is determined by Nature. All other options are incor-
rect. I apply this policy structure to clearly capture the event that the second mover
herds its action to that of the first mover. It is noteworthy that, as in Caillaud and
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Tirole (2002), the policy options are not assumed to be on any particular distribution.
Instead, the existence of an indefinite number of wrong choices makes the situation
in which multiple actors receive private signals suggesting a same wrong choice to be
a probability 0 event.
The government observes a signal sGJ indicating the correct policy, where J ∈
{h, l}. The signal may be noisy. When the government is competent, the probability
of the signal matching the true state Pr(sGh = ω) is γ. With probability 1− γ, sGh is
randomly drawn from the infinitely many wrong options, and hence Pr(sGh = ω) = 0.
For an incompetent government, the probability Pr(sGl = ω) is γ, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Similar to the government’s decision, the media outlet chooses its report r from
a set of infinite options. The media outlet observes x and also a private signal sMJ ,
where J ∈ {h, l} before reporting. The probability that the competent media outlet
learns the correct policy is Pr(sMh = ω) = µ. For an incompetent media outlet, the
probability Pr(sMl = ω) is µ, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ µ ≤ 1. The media outlet then decides what
information r to report to the voter. When x 6= sMJ , I call r = sMJ truthful reporting,
and r = x yes man reporting.
To simplify exposition, I denote the ex-ante expected quality of the government
as E(γ) = pγ + (1− p)γ, and the expected quality of the media outlet as E(µ) =
qµ + (1− q)µ. To focus on the interesting cases, I consider that the qualities of the
competent media outlet, the government, and the incompetent media outlet are or-
dered as µ ≥ E(γ) ≥ µ. For numerical analyses in the comparative statics section, we
only need µ ≥ µ.
An important attribute of this model is that, policy-wise, the government and
the media are unbiased. This is because I aim to show that conformist reporting
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is possible even when no political bias is involved. This can be understood as all
members of the society share a common interest in issues such as national security
or economic stability.
As yes-man behavior is most likely to be detected in this situation than in other
environments such as a binary choice setting, the Caillaud and Tirole setup, combined
with the most severe punishment imposed by the voter (discussed below), means that
the model is analyzing the most unlikely case that the media outlet will deviate
from truthful reporting. After the analysis of the general model, I discuss how the
equilibria change only slightly when there is also uncertainty about the ideological
position of the media outlet.
Learning, Reputation, and Reelection The voter decides whether to retain the in-
cumbent by observing the policy implemented x and learning information from the
media. The voter does not observe the consequences of the policy directly. The justi-
fication is that the consequences of a policy are sometimes witnessed long after it is
implemented (Besley 2007, p. 80). Instead, the voter reads the related report from the
media to determine the quality of the government and decides whether to reelect the
incumbent. At the same time, the media outlet builds (or ruins) its reputation via its
report.
This paper also considers the case that, with probability ρ, information from other
exogenous sources, such as foreign media reports or natural disasters, reveal a perfect
signal of the true state sV = ω to the voter. In other words, the voter could poten-
tially, with probability ρ, receive perfect ex-post feedback about the state of the world.
Formally, Pr(sV = ω) = ρ and Pr(sV = ∅) = 1− ρ. With the policy decision x, the
media report r, and the exogenous information sV , the voter updates her beliefs about
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the type of the government and the media outlet, and makes her reelection decision.3
The voter chooses the new government G′ either by retaining the incumbent or by a
random draw from the candidate pool. In the latter case, I suppose Pr(τG
′
= h) = p.
Also, I assume that if indifferent, the voter retains the incumbent.
It is assumed that the voter applies the most severe punishment to the media outlet
once she finds it does not report truthfully. That is, once the media outlet is caught
cheating, the voter believes it is incompetent, or formally, Pr(τM = h|sV = ω 6= (r =
x)) = 0. Relaxing this assumption only disincentivizes the media outlet to report
truthfully.
The Payoffs The model incorporates the idea of reputational payoff used in Kartik
and Van Weelden’s (2019) analysis of cheap talk in elections. The payoff for the media
outlet UM is a strictly increasing mapping of its reputation for competence. Formally,
I denote UM = Π(qˆ), where Pr(τM = h|x, r, sV) = qˆ, and Π : qˆ → R+ can be any
strictly increasing function. The media outlet enjoys utility from an increase in its
reputation. For example, higher reputation could lead to an expansion of readership
or an increase in advertising revenue.
Similarly, I define the payoff of the government as UG = ∆( pˆ), where Pr(τG =
h|x, r, sV) = pˆ. ∆ : pˆ→ R+ can be any strictly increasing function. The government’s
increasing utility from reputation comes from the rising probability of winning re-
election, increasing political donations due to popularity, etc.
3Letting sV come after the reelection does not affect the main results of this paper. This change
affects the incumbent’s reelection probability because the voter can no longer update the incumbent’s
posterior with sV . If the media outlet is only concerned about its own reputation, its reporting strategy,
which this paper focuses on, does not change. If the media outlet has its own political bias and cares
more about the incumbent’s reelection than its own reputation, this change incentivizes the outlet to
untruthfully endorse or criticize the government. Overall, the present setup does not overestimate the
problem of not reporting truthfully.
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The voter wants to know the quality of the government to facilitate her political
selection. The payoff for the voter is UV = 1{τG′=h}, which means the voter enjoys a
utility normalized to one when she selects a competent government G′.
Timing The timing of this game is as follows and can be summarized as in Figure
2.1:
1. Nature chooses the types of actors τG = J and τM = J, J ∈ {h, l} and the state of
the world ω
2. G observes sGJ and implements a policy x
3. M observes sMJ and x, and reports r
4. With probability ρ, V learns the true state via other information sources
5. V forms the posterior belief about the types of G (pˆ) and M (qˆ) and selects G′
6. The payoffs are realized, and the game ends.
Figure 2.1: Timeline
N
chooses
τG , τM and ω
G
observes sGJ
implements x
M
observes sMJ and x
reports r
V
learns sV
with probability ρ
V
forms pˆ and qˆ
selects G′
Equilibrium Concept The equilibrium concept applied is pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, and weakly dominated strategies are excluded. Similar to Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2006), the main goal of the analysis is to check whether there could exist
truthful equilibrium in which both types of media outlet report truthfully. Formally,
truthful reporting equilibrium means the media outlet reports the information it learnt
truthfully to the voter, i.e., r = sMJ . When a truthful reporting equilibrium does not
exist, I characterize a yes-man equilibrium, which is a pooling equilibrium in which
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both types of the media outlet report an endorsement of the government’s decision
independent of the private information, formally r = x. Discussing the yes-man
equilibrium is reasonable because media outlets are not likely to challenge the gov-
ernment without very good reason. A good relationship with officials is usually
critical for future news reporting (Eraslan and O¨zertu¨rk, 2017). Hence, intuitively, we
can think that if a truthful reporting equilibrium fails to exist, the media outlet will
automatically switch to the yes-man reporting strategy.
With a truthful reporting equilibrium, the voter updates her belief about the qual-
ity of the government based on the media’s report. With a yes-man equilibrium, the
voter does not update her belief. I have also checked for the existence of separating
equilibrium or semi-separating equilibrium, but neither exists.
2.4 Analysis
Ideal Case: When Truthful Reporting Exists
The voter wants the media outlet to be an effective watchdog. The ideal world for the
voter is one in which only a competent media outlet exists and it always truthfully
reports its information. Thus, when the media report endorses the government’s
policy, the voter can infer that the government is more likely to be of high competence,
and when the media report conflicts with the government’s choice, then the voter
knows the government is more likely to be of low quality. The voter can therefore
decide whether to reelect the incumbent following the media report.
Formally, this first-best situation means
Pr(τG = h|r = x) ≥ p ≥ Pr(τG = h|r 6= x).
Suppose Pr(τM = h) = 1 and the media outlet reports information truthfully. By
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Bayes’ Rule,
Pr(τG = h|r = x) = pγµ
pγµ+ (1− p)γµ =
pγ
pγ+ (1− p)γ , (2.1)
and Pr(τG = h|r = x) is always greater than p when γ > γ.
Similarly, we have
Pr(τG = h|r 6= x) = p(1− γµ)
p(1− γµ) + (1− p)(1− γµ) , (2.2)
and p is always greater than Pr(τG = h|r 6= x) when γ > γ.
Lemma 2.4.1. A media report is a meaningful signal of the government’s competence if and
only if the media outlet reports truthfully, independent of the quality of the media outlet.
As such, we know that a media report is a meaningful signal of the government’s
competence if the media outlet4 reports information truthfully (instead of reporting
as a yes man), but in the following sections, I show that because of the media outlet’s
reputational concerns, the voter is not likely to learn the type of the government from
the media report.
Case 1: No Other Source of Information
Following the practice of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), the analysis begins with a
case with a single media outlet. In this case, there are no other sources of informa-
tion available for the voter, so she relies solely on one media outlet’s report to learn
the quality of the government. In a democratic context, this happens in a country
with a media monopoly, such as Brazil (see Amaral and Guimara˜es, 1994), or with a
4Whether the media outlet is competent or not is irrelevant because µ will be cancelled out during
the calculation of (2.1) ≥ p and p ≥ (2.2). The intuition is that as long as the reporting strategy is
consistently truthful, regardless of the competence of the media outlet, a competent government is
more likely to be endorsed. Thus, the media report is meaningful.
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very homogeneous media market evolved after a series of mergers (as discussed in
Anderson and McLaren, 2012).
I solve this game using backward induction and checking if there is a profitable
deviation for the media outlet from the truthful reporting equilibrium. The voter up-
dates her beliefs and makes her electoral decision based on the media report when
the media outlet reports truthfully, instead of sending a babbling signal. It is obvi-
ous that once the media outlet receives a signal sMJ = x, it will transmit the signal
truthfully. Whereas, if the media outlet receives a signal sMJ 6= x, the media outlet
needs to decide to report either r = x or r 6= x. If the voter believes the media outlet
reports truthfully, by Bayes’ rule, the voter’s posterior belief about the media outlet’s
competence when r 6= x is:
Pr(τM = h|r 6= x) = q(1− µE(γ))
q(1− µE(γ)) + (1− q)(1− µE(γ)) . (2.3)
If r = x, again supposing that the voter believes the media outlet reports truthfully,
the posterior is:
Pr(τM = h|r = x) = qE(γ)µ
qE(γ)µ+ (1− q)E(γ)µ =
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ . (2.4)
Comparing the two posteriors, we can see that, except when the media outlet
does not have to signal its type by its report,5 endorsing the government (r = x)
leads to strictly higher reputation for the media outlet. Thus, when receiving a signal
that is different from the government’s decision, the media outlet will deviate from
truthful reporting. The mechanism driving this result is simple: Being a yes man
yields higher posterior reputation for a media outlet if the voter believes the report is
truthful. Thus, the truthful reporting equilibrium does not exist.
5Pr(τM = h|r = x) = Pr(τM = h|r 6= x) when q = 1, q = 0, or µ = µ. In these three cases,
there is essentially only one type of media outlet, and thus the media outlet does not need to signal
its competence.
26
When it is in yes-man equilibrium, because the report is a babbling signal and the
voter does not update beliefs with it, the posterior is Pr(τM = h|r = x) = Pr(τM =
h|r 6= x) = q. Thus, there is no profitable deviation for the media to report r 6= x
instead of r = x. As noted earlier, it is intuitive to understand that the media outlet
will not issue a report challenging the governments decision for no obvious reason.
The government’s action is very straightforward in this model. When the gov-
ernment is making the policy decision, the only information on hand is the signal
sGJ . Thus, irrespective of the media outlet’s reporting strategy, the probability that the
decision and the report match (r = sGJ ) is always higher than the probability that they
don’t match (r 6= sGJ ).6 Assuming a truthful reporting equilibrium, when observing
r = sGJ , the voter believes the government is more likely to be competent. Therefore,
it is a dominant strategy for the government to set the policy x = sGJ , and this is true
in all cases discussed in this paper.
The yes-man equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in this case. It is robust to Cho
and Kreps’s Intuitive Criterion because the competent media outlet cannot do better
by reporting r 6= x. On the other hand, any separating equilibrium—for example only
the competent media outlet reports truthfully—cannot survive the Intuitive Criterion. In
this situation, the incompetent media outlet has an incentive to always report r 6= x
in order to be viewed as competent.
The following example can demonstrate the mechanism clearly: Suppose the
government and the media outlet received different signals, and {µ = 0.6, µ =
0.4, E(γ) = 0.6, q = 0.6}. Then, if the voter believes the news report is truthful,
the posterior about the media outlet’s competence is 0.558. If, instead of reporting
6When the media outlet reports truthfully, it is more likely to have r = x by choosing x = sGJ than
any x 6= sGJ . When the media outlet reports untruthfully, it is always r = x. Hence, choosing x = sGJ is
always optimal for the government.
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r 6= x, the media outlet reports r = x, the posterior increases to 0.692. Thus, it is a
profitable deviation for the media outlet. In this case, the media outlet never has an
incentive to report truthfully. The media outlet is a yes man instead of a watchdog,
and the voter cannot infer the quality of the government from the media report. Fol-
lowing the assumed tie-break rule, the voter retains the incumbent because she does
not find the incumbent and challenger discernibly different from one another (pˆ = p).
Proposition 2.4.1. When the media outlet is the only source of information for the voter,
there is no truthful reporting equilibrium. Even when the media outlet is more competent
than the government, it does not report truthfully.
Case 2: When the Voter May Learn from Other Sources
Now I analyze the general case of the model where, with some probability ρ ∈ (0, 1),
the voter learns the true state from other information sources.
When ρ = 1 To find the conditions for the media outlet to report truthfully when
ρ ∈ (0, 1) , we need to find the posteriors attainable with different actions when ρ = 0
and ρ = 1. We already have the posteriors for ρ = 0, so now we need to find the pos-
teriors for ρ = 1. The detailed calculations are in the appendix. The analysis shows
that when the voter can perfectly learn the true state ex post, the competent media
outlet will always report truthfully because the probability for the competent media
outlet to be correct is higher than that for the government (µ > E(γ)). However, the
incompetent media outlet could still have an incentive to report untruthfully even
when yes-man behavior is very likely to be detected.7 To have a truthful reporting
7Whenever the voter observes r = x 6= ω, she knows the media outlet is a yes man, because the
probability for the government and media outlet to receive the same wrong signal is 0 (Caillaud and
Tirole, 2002).
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equilibrium, we need both types of media outlets to report truthfully. Thus, a truthful
reporting equilibrium is not guaranteed despite the fact that the voter can perfectly
learn the true state ex post. If the truthful reporting equilibrium is not guaranteed
even in this extreme case,8 we can expect that the truthful reporting equilibrium is
less likely to exist in the general case.
When ρ ∈ (0, 1) With the posteriors in different situations when ρ = 0 and ρ = 1, we
can analyze the general case and find the conditions for the existence of the truthful
reporting equilibrium. The detailed calculations are in the appendix.
The condition for the competent media to report truthfully is:
ρ ≥
µ
E(µ) −
1−µE(γ)
T
(1+ µ− E(γ)) µE(µ) + (1− µ)
1−µ
1−E(µ) −
1−µE(γ)
T
≡ ρh, (2.5)
where T = q(1− µE(γ)) + (1− q)(1− µE(γ)).9
The condition parallel to (2.5) for the incompetent media is:
ρ ≥
µ
E(µ) −
1−µE(γ)
T
(1+ µ− E(γ)) µE(µ) + (1− µ)
1−µ
1−E(µ) −
1−µE(γ)
T
≡ ρl. (2.6)
Given µ ≥ µ, we have ρl ≥ ρh. As expected, an incompetent media outlet
is less likely to report truthfully than a competent one. Hence, ρl is the binding
condition for the truthful reporting equilibrium. A numerical example is when
{E(γ) = 0.5, µ = 0.6, µ = 0.2, q = 0.5}, we have ρh = 0.6 and ρl ≈ 0.882. Hence,
the truthful reporting equilibrium exists if and only if ρ ≥ ρl ≈ 0.882. This means
that unless the probability of receiving information from other sources is very high,
a truthful reporting equilibrium does not exist.
8In this case, the media report is actually made redundant by the availability of exogenous infor-
mation.
9T is the ex-ante probability that the media outlet and the government receive different signals.
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When fixing {µ = 0.6, µ = 0.2, q = 0.5}, the conditions for the two types of media
outlet to report truthfully ρh and ρl can be graphically shown as in Figure 2.2.10
The area between the horizontal line ρ = 1 and ρl is where the truthful reporting
equilibrium exists. If the government is expected to be reasonably competent, that is
E(γ) ≥ 0.5, the truthful reporting equilibrium only exists in a very restricted area,
and it requires a very high probability for the voter to learn from other sources to
sustain this equilibrium. Figure 2.2 also demonstrates that even when the quality of
the government is expected to be very low, the truthful reporting equilibrium can
exist only with a sufficient probability for the voter to learn from other information
sources.
Figure 2.2: Conditions for Truthful Reporting
Proposition 2.4.2. Given the expected competence of the government (E(γ)), when the voter
10In Figure 2.2, the solid line ρl is the binding condition, and the dotted line ρh is satisfied automat-
ically once ρl is satisfied, but to illustrate the dynamic clearly, ρh is still shown in all of the graphs.
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observes x, receives r from the media outlet and, with probability ρ, learns sV from other
sources, the existence of the truthful reporting equilibrium requires the probability for the
voter to learns from other sources to be ρ ≥ ρl.
Comparative Statics
Based on Proposition 2.4.2, I perform three numerical comparative statics exercises.11
First of all, I set the quality of the competent media outlet µ as a variable and fix the
quality of the incompetent outlet µ and the probability to have the competent outlet
q. Figure 2.3 shows that, counterintuitively, when the quality of the competent media
outlet increases, the truthful reporting equilibrium becomes less likely to occur.
Figure 2.3: Comparative Statics 1
Two forces drive this surprising result. First, as the quality gap between the two
types of media outlets widens, if the true state is not revealed ex post but the voter
11Solving for closed-form solutions is impossible as the posterior functions are a very complicated
composition of functions.
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believes the media report is truthful, as before, the media outlet has a higher posterior
when its report matches the policy decision and a lower posterior when its report
does not match the policy decision. However, now the difference between these two
posteriors becomes larger. Thus, matching the report to the policy leads to higher
return from reputation. Second, if ex post the report is verified to be correct, the media
outlet is more likely to be competent, and because the difference in posteriors of
being correct and being incorrect increases when the quality gap widens, being correct
becomes a strong signal of competence and leads to higher reputational returns. The
incompetent outlet becomes more willing to take the risk of being caught cheating by
reporting as a yes man.
For the second set of comparative statics, I fix the quality of the competent media
outlet µ and the probability to have the competent media outlet q, and vary the
quality of the incompetent outlet µ. From Figure 2.4, we know that when µ increases,
the required ρl to support the truthful reporting equilibrium decreases. The result
again indicates that the likelihood of the truthful reporting equilibrium decreases as
the difference between the types of media outlets increases. When the two types are
of similar quality, such as the case where µ = 0.6 and µ = 0.5, a truthful reporting
equilibrium is more likely to exist. Even in this situation, though, the quality of the
government cannot be too high, and the probability of learning from other sources of
information cannot be too low. The driving force for this result is that deviating from
truthful reporting is more rewarding for a media outlet with a lower competence µ.
This is because when the incompetent media outlet is less likely to receive a correct
signal, it is more willing to pander to the government policy in order to increase the
probability the media report is correct.
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Figure 2.4: Comparative Statics 2
For the final set of comparative statics, I fix the qualities of the two types of media
outlets µ and µ, and allow the probability of having the competent media outlet q to
vary. Figure 2.5 shows that when the media outlet is more likely to be competent, the
likelihood of truthful reporting increases. So, although the previous results show that
homogeneity of the types of media outlet leads to truthful reporting, ceteris paribus, it
is more likely for the voter to receive a truthful report when the probability of having
a competent media outlet is higher.
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Figure 2.5: Comparative Statics 3
It is quite intuitive to think that critical reporting is less likely to occur when the
quality of the incompetent outlet declines, but it is surprising that when the quality
of the competent outlet is further improved, the probability of critical reporting also
decreases. As government subsidy is usually considered as a promising means of im-
proving the quality of news reporting (see Sunstein, 2017), the first set of comparative
statics serves as a warning. Those rewards and supports for competent news outlets,
aiming at further improving their quality, may turn out to make critical reporting
even more unlikely. Improving the quality of incompetent news outlets, as the sec-
ond set of comparative statics shows, could be a more effective way to encourage
critical reporting.
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Political Ideology of the Media Outlet
The baseline analysis intentionally avoids discussion about media ideological con-
cerns in order to show that even without political agenda and media capture, media
outlets may not report truthfully. However, it is interesting to see how the equilib-
rium reporting behavior changes when the media outlet is concerned not only with
its own reputation but also with ideology. Specifically, I look at how the likelihood
to reach the truthful reporting equilibrium changes once the media outlet’s utility
depends not only on its own posterior but also the incumbent’s, because the outlet
cares also about the popularity and reelection of the incumbent. Formally, the payoff
functions are U fM = Π(qˆ) + I( pˆ) for a pro-incumbent outlet, and U
e
M = Π(qˆ)− I( pˆ)
for an anti-incumbent outlet. As in the baseline model, returns from the outlet’s rep-
utation Π(qˆ) is a strictly increasing function of qˆ, and returns from the incumbent’s
reputation I( pˆ) is a strictly increasing function of pˆ. The superscript e stands for
enemy (of the incumbent) and f stands for for friend (of the incumbent).
To simplify exposition, I denote the following payoffs: Π(Pr(τM = h|r = x)) ≡ Π;
Π(Pr(τM = h|r 6= x)) ≡ Π; I(Pr(τG = h|r = x)) ≡ I; I(Pr(τG = h|r 6= x)) ≡ I. The
first two terms are the returns for the media outlet from its reputation, and the last
two terms are the returns for the media outlet from the government’s reputation. Both
are conditional on whether the report matches with the policy decision. From the
baseline analysis, we know that when the voter believes the media outlet is reporting
truthfully, matching the report to the government policy yields higher reputation and,
thus, higher returns than when the report does not agree with the policy. Hence, Π >
Π. On the other hand, the voter’s posterior belief about the government’s competence
is higher when the report matches with the policy than when they conflict. Hence,
35
for a pro-incumbent media outlet, the return I is greater than I. An anti-incumbent
outlet, on the other hand, prefers −I to −I.
When the media outlet is the only source of information for the voter (ρ = 0),
and supposing that the voter believes the media outlet is reporting truthfully, a pro-
incumbent outlet will always be a yes man as in Case 1, because (Π−Π) + (I − I) >
0. For an anti-incumbent outlet, it will report as a yes man if (Π−Π)− (I − I) > 0.
That means, if the outlet cares about its reputation over its ideology, it will still report
as a yes man. If the media outlet values its ideology over its reputation ((Π−Π)−
(I− I) < 0), it will always report a government criticism. Even when the media outlet
receives a signal sMJ = x, it will deviate to report s
M
J 6= x.
When the voter is able to learn the true state from other sources of information
(sV) with certainty (ρ = 1), the voter can update the posterior of the government
using sV . As a result, a fabricated critique or endorsement neither harms nor helps
the government. Therefore, the media outlet’s decision depends only on whether
matching its report with the government policy improves its own reputation. The
reasoning is entirely the same as in the baseline analysis. A competent media out-
let will always transmit its signal truthfully, and the incompetent media outlet may
pander its reporting to the government in order to maximize the media outlet’s own
reputation.
The general case is again in between of the two extremes, ρ = 0 and ρ = 1. Be-
cause the results when ρ = 0 or ρ = 1 only differ from the baseline results when
the media outlet is anti-incumbent and cares more about ideology, a pro-incumbent
media outlet and an anti-incumbent outlet that cares more about its own reputation
behave identically to the baseline results. When the media outlet is anti-incumbent
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and cares more about ideology, the outlet is more likely to report government criti-
cism. However, unfounded critical reporting is not equivalent to truthful reporting.
The information problem for the voter still prevails.
It is worth noting that whether the voter knows if the media outlet is supporting
the incumbent or not does not affect the media reporting strategy. When the voter is
uncertain about the media outlet’s ideology, she knows that a government criticism
is more likely to be from an anti-incumbent outlet, and an endorsement is more
likely to be from a pro-incumbent one. However, an anti-incumbent media outlet
has no incentive to pretend to be a pro-incumbent one by endorsing the government
(otherwise it suffers −I), and vice versa. Hence, reputational concerns dominate a
given media outlet’s decision-making.
2.5 Multiple Media Outlets
I now extend the analysis from the baseline case of a unique outlet to cases with
two or more media outlets. The media outlets are indexed as: M1, M2, ..., Mn. The
type of each media outlet is private information, and the outlets report news r1, r2,
..., rn simultaneously and independently, conditional on the true state of the world.12
Without loss of generality, I analyze the game from the perspective of M1.
Two Media Outlets First, consider the case where the voter can learn the informa-
tion from two media outlets M1 and M2. Suppose that the voter believes the two me-
dia outlets play the truthful reporting equilibrium, and the true state is not revealed
12If the media outlets report sequentially, the government’s decision and all earlier news reports
create multiple focal points for the upcoming media outlets to pander to. Thus, a true state will not
be revealed by the fact that at least two media outlets report the same story. Hence, yes-man behavior
is harder to detect. In other words, the simultaneous case constitutes the most likely case for truthful
reporting.
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by other sources (ρ = 0). The posteriors given different actions and the probabilities
for these different situations to occur are summarized in Table 2.1. Throughout this
section, to simplify the notation regarding the probability of occurrence of different
situations, I use µ (without overline or underline) to denote that it is either of two
cases: µ when the media outlet M1 is incompetent and µ when M1 is competent.
Table 2.1: Posteriors Given Different Actions: Two Media Outlets (ρ = 0)
Probability of Occurrence qˆ When ρ = 0
x = r1 = r2 E(γ)E(µ)µ
qµ
qµ+(1−q)µ
x 6= (r1 = r2) [1− E(γ)]E(µ)µ qµqµ+(1−q)µ
(x = r1) 6= r2 E(γ)[1− E(µ)]µ qµqµ+(1−q)µ
(x = r2) 6= r1 E(γ)E(µ)(1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
x 6= r1 6= r2 1− E(γ)E(µ)− E(γ)µ− E(µ)µ+ 2E(γ)E(µ)µ Ψ2
Note: Denote
q(1− E(γ)E(µ)− E(γ)µ− E(µ)µ+ 2E(γ)E(µ)µ)
q(1− E(γ)E(µ)− E(γ)µ− E(µ)µ+ 2E(γ)E(µ)µ) + (1− q)(1− E(γ)E(µ)− E(γ)µ− E(µ)µ+ 2E(γ)E(µ)µ)
as Ψ2 .
When deviating from truthful reporting, the posterior will be qµqµ+(1−q)µ , which is
greater or equal to both Ψ2 and
q(1−µ)
q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ) (unless q = 0, q = 1 or µ = µ). Thus,
the media outlet has an incentive to deviate from the truthful reporting equilibrium,
and there is no truthful reporting equilibrium.
Now, consider the situation where the voter can learn the true state of the world
from other sources of information with certainty (ρ = 1). Table 2.2 summarizes the
posteriors given different actions and the probabilities for these different situations
to occur when the voter believes the media outlets play the truthful reporting equi-
librium.
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Table 2.2: Posteriors Given Different Actions: Two Media Outlets (ρ = 1)
Probability of Occurrence qˆ when ρ = 1
x = r1 = r2 E(γ)E(µ)µ
qµ
qµ+(1−q)µ
x 6= (r1 = r2) [1− E(γ)]E(µ)µ qµqµ+(1−q)µ
(x = r1) 6= r2 E(γ)[1− E(µ)]µ qµqµ+(1−q)µ
(x = r2) 6= r1 E(γ)E(µ)(1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
x 6= r1 6= r2 6= ω [1− E(γ)][1− E(µ)](1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
r1 6= r2 6= x = ω E(γ)[1− E(µ)](1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
x 6= r2 6= r1 = ω [1− E(γ)][1− E(µ)]µ qµqµ+(1−q)µ
x 6= r1 6= r2 = ω [1− E(γ)]E(µ)(1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
If a media outlet deviates from reporting truthfully when the voter will observe
the true state with certainty, its posterior reputation is
E(γ)(1− µ) qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ .
As in the baseline case, the competent media outlet has no incentive to deviate from
truthful reporting, but the incompetent type will only report truthfully if the follow-
ing condition is satisfied:
(1− µ) q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ≥ [E(γ)[1− µ+ E(µ)µ]− µ]
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ .
This condition does not always hold. For example, when {q = 0.2, µ = 0.8, µ = 0.2},
the condition is only satisfied when E(γ) ≤ 0.34. Hence we know that ρ = 1, again,
does not guarantee the existence of a truthful reporting equilibrium.
The general case we are interested in is a convex combination of the situations in
terms of ρ, summarized in the two tables. That is, the voter may sometimes learn the
true state from the perfect feedback, but not always. The analysis shows that, as in
the baseline case, an incompetent media outlet does not always follow the truthful
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reporting strategy. Essentially, when there are two media outlets, they play the same
signaling game simultaneously, so that one report cannot discredit the other since the
voter cannot learn the state of the world from other sources. The decision made by
the government then serves as a focal point for the media outlets to tend toward. The
truthful reporting equilibrium exists only when the voter can learn the true state of
the world from other sources with a sufficiently high probability.13
Three or More Media Outlets To analyze cases with three or more media outlets,
I use a general approach and categorize n media outlets into three groups: M1, Mi,
and Mj. Mi and Mj partition the n− 1 media outlets other than M1 into two groups,
each of which consists of at least one media outlet. Each media outlet within a group
does not necessarily receive the same signal.
Again, the analysis should focus on the situation where M1 receives a signal dif-
ferent from the government’s decision x and compare posteriors from r 6= x and
r = x in different scenarios, presuming every other actor follows the truthful re-
porting strategy. The different scenarios, their probabilities of occurrence, and the
corresponding posterior beliefs, are summarized in the two tables below. Table 2.3 is
for the situation ρ = 0, and Table 2.4 is for ρ = 1.
The difference between this case and those previously analyzed is that if some
Mi and Mj receive the correct signal and report truthfully, yes-man behavior will
be detected. Hence, supposing all other media outlets follow the truthful reporting
strategy, even when ρ = 0, yes-man reporting is harmful (to the media outlet) if: (1)
M1 actually received a correct signal but deviates from truthful reporting (because it
13Because in this model, the media outlets work on one dimension and are not biased, either mecha-
nism suggested in Krishna and Morgan (2001) or Battaglini (2002), in which information could be fully
revealed because the information senders have biases with different directions or on different policy
dimensions, does not apply.
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is possible to match reports with one or more other news outlets on a non-x option,
and such a report is perfect evidence of being correct) or (2) there are at least two
media outlets that receive the correct signal (because the true state is revealed, and
the yes-man behavior is detected).
When the number of media outlets becomes large, it is certain that at least some
media outlets will receive the correct signal, but truthful reporting equilibrium is
still not guaranteed. The analysis shows that when the media market is in perfect
competition (n → ∞), the role of exogenous information sources (ρ) can be replaced
by the existence of a large number of media outlets because it is certain that at least
two media outlets will receive the correct signal. Thus, supposing that the media
outlets report truthfully, the voter is going to learn the true state for sure ex post.
Indeed, when n → ∞, the case with ρ = 0 is equivalent to the case with ρ = 1.
Even so, an incompetent media outlet still has an incentive to be a yes man whenever
[E(γ)− µ]µ− (1− µ)E(µ) ≥ 0 (for example, when {E(γ) = 0.5, µ = 0.8, µ = 0.2, q =
0.5}). Thus, a truthful reporting equilibrium is still not guaranteed and the baseline
result is robust in this extreme case.
Table 2.3: Posteriors Given Different Actions: More than Two Media Outlets (ρ = 0)
Probability of Occurrence qˆ when ρ = 0
x = r1 E(γ)µ
qµ
qµ+(1−q)µ
x 6= (r1 = ri) 6= rj Σ1 + Σ2 qµqµ+(1−q)µ
x = ri 6= r1 6= rj E(γ)[1− (1− E(µ))n−1](1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
x 6= (ri = rj) 6= r1 Σ3 q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
x 6= r1 6= ri 6= rj Φn Ψn
Note: Denote Σ1 ≡ [1− E(γ)][(n− 1)E(µ)(1− E(µ))n−2 ]µ;
Σ2 ≡ [1− E(γ)][1− (1− E(µ))n−1 − (n− 1)E(µ)(1− E(µ))n−2 ]µ;
Σ3 ≡ [1− E(γ)][1− (1− E(µ))n−1 − (n− 1)E(µ)(1− E(µ))n−2 ](1− µ);
Φn ≡ [1− E(γ)][1− E(µ)]n−1(1− µ) + E(γ)[1− E(µ)]n−1(1− µ) + (n− 1)E(µ)[1− E(γ)](1− E(µ))n−2(1− µ) + [1− E(γ)][1− E(µ)]n−1µ;
Ψn ≡ qΦ
h
n
qΦhn+(1−q)Φln
.
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Table 2.4: Posteriors Given Different Actions: More than Two Media Outlets (ρ = 1)
Probability of Occurrence qˆ when ρ = 1
x = r1 E(γ)µ
qµ
qµ+(1−q)µ
x 6= (r1 = ri) 6= rj [1− E(γ)][1− E(µ)]n−1µ qµqµ+(1−q)µ
x = ri 6= r1 6= rj E(γ)[1− E(µ)]n−1(1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
x 6= (ri = rj) 6= r1 Σ3 q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
Every actor wrong [1− E(γ)][(1− E(µ))n−1](1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
G correct E(γ)[1− E(µ)](1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
At least a Mi correct E(γ)[1− E(µ)]n−1(1− µ) q(1−µ)q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ)
M1 correct [1− E(γ)][1− E(µ)]n−1µ qµqµ+(1−q)µ
Proposition 2.5.1. The existence of multiple media outlets does not guarantee truthful re-
porting. Even when there are an infinite number of media outlets, the truthful reporting
equilibrium exists if and only if [E(γ)− µ]µ− (1− µ)E(µ) < 0.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In democracies, voters need to know whether the incumbent government is compe-
tent in order to make election decisions. Therefore, apart from observing the govern-
ment’s policy decisions, voters also acquire related information from various infor-
mation sources, of which media is the primary one. However, all too often, media
reports are neither critical nor independent. In this paper, I study a model to see why
media outlets cannot dutifully serve as watchdogs.
I argue that reputational concerns can sufficiently lead to a lack of independent
reporting; any coercive power or policy bias is not necessary. The mechanism is
that the voter wants to learn the competence of the government, but news reports
also reflect the quality of the media outlets, not just the quality of the government.
Reputational concerns thus make the media outlets unable to commit to reporting
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information truthfully. Instead, the media outlets tend to endorse the government
policy as yes men, because matching (or pandering) reports to the government’s
decisions weakly increases media reputation in most situations. Therefore, the voter
is not able to learn valuable information from media reports even though media
outlets may not be partisan or subject to coercive power. This result is robust under
the different scenarios discussed in the paper: when the electorate can perfectly learn
the true state ex post, when the media outlet cares also about political ideology, and
when there exist multiple—even an infinite number of—media outlets.
The main implication of this paper is that when the government is believed to
be at least reasonably competent, truthful reporting is very unlikely to exist. This
is a serious problem for democratic accountability because we want to accurately
assess the performance of the government, not be misled by its relative popularity.
However, we will not have sufficient information at hand when the government seems
to be competent. Essentially, to have a truthful reporting equilibrium, the expected
competence of the government must be low enough, while the probability for the
voter to learn from other information sources must be high enough.
Comparative statics of this model indicate that widening the quality gap between
types of media is detrimental. It is intuitive to think that increasing the quality of
competent media outlets could increase the probability of having truthful report-
ing. Consequently, there are many schemes and rewards aiming at supporting high-
quality media outlets to further improve their quality. However, the model shows
that, other things being equal, it worsens the yes-man problem as the quality gap
between media types is widened. Instead, it would be helpful to encourage the low-
quality media outlets to improve, thus narrowing the quality gap.
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Future research can empirically test the argument by estimating the perceived
competence of the government (i.e., the popularity of the government) and the media
in different issue areas and applying a keyword based method adopted by Larcinese
et al. (2011), or performing quantitative textual analysis (Laver et al., 2003; Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2010), to identify the reporting stances of the media outlets on relevant
issues. The relationship between the perceived competence of the actors and the
criticalness of reports in different issue areas could then be evaluated.
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Chapter 3
Tell Me the Truth? Dictatorship and
the Commitment to Media Freedom
“It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any public place or
within range of a telescreen. The smallest thing could give you away . . . . In any case, to
wear an improper expression on your face (to look incredulous when a victory was
announced, for example) was itself a punishable offense. There was even a word for it in
Newspeak: facecrime, it was called. (65)”
— George Orwell, 1984
3.1 Introduction
As in George Orwell’s 1984, dictatorships have long been viewed as an antithesis of
freedom of expression. The burgeoning literature on comparative authoritarianism,
however, finds a wide variation in media freedom among nondemocratic regimes and
some dictators allow a higher degree of it in hopes of collecting local information
(Egorov et al. 2009, Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014; Lorentzen, 2014, Qin et al., 2017).
As the “authoritarian resilience” thesis has it, the understanding of social problems
is the first-order task for an authoritarian government to correctly respond to public
demands (Nathan, 2003: 14). Henceforth, when Mikhail Gorbachev tried to bring a
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new lease of life to the regime in late 1980s, one of the major reforms he introduced
was to lift the media censorship. According to his former chief spokesman, Gennadi
Gerasimov,
“Hoping to use the media to help identify his nation’s problems in order to solve
them, Gorbachev gradually lifted Communist Party control of the mass media
starting in 1985. In a matter of months, he introduced a degree of freedom unheard
of before in the Russian press, or, to use his term, glasnost. He viewed this
opening not only as a window on what was happening in the country, but also as
a chance to ensure feedback as he tackled economic and political problems facing
the nation.” (Gerasimov, 1998: 2-3)
In other words, while media freedom can sometimes be threatening to dictators’
survival for exposing politically sensitive information, it can also be instrumental for
them to acquiring the information elusive to their private sources (e.g., secret police).
As a result, when the information asymmetry between the ruler and the ruled is
severe enough, dictators will have incentive to relax their control over the media “to
learn from bottom-up information and to address social problems before they become
threatening” (Qin et al., 2017: 137).
The discussions based on this instrumental view of authoritarian media freedom,
however, treat media outlets under a dictatorship as a non-strategic actor and entirely
neglect the case of interim censorship that dictators can censor a piece of news after
it is published but before it reaches the general public. As such, media outlets are
shadowed by the possibility of being punished for their truth-telling, especially when
the truth could destabilize the regime. Even if an authoritarian government explicitly
grants the freedom of expression to people ex ante, the fear of being punished ex post
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can still make them remain silent or self-censor the information unfavorable to the
dictator (see, for example, Stern and Hassid, 2012). However, as it will be discussed
in the literature review, most existing works hold the view that once the government
sets a certain level of media freedom, information will be automatically revealed accordingly.
As a matter of fact, students of dictatorships have long understood very well that
dictators face a serious informational problem for being unable to know “whether
the population genuinely worships them or worships them because they command
such worship” (Wintrobe, 1998: 20). While, on the outside, dictators’ commands
are met with obedience, the truth on the ground—e.g., the true level of people’s
support for the regime or real problems of their governance—might still elude them
if self-censorship prevails. In other words, unless dictators are able to make a credible
commitment to not censoring any news reports, the non-sustainable media freedom
policy would not be able to quench their thirst for information.1
In this paper, we make media a strategic actor and introduce the dictator’s com-
mitment problem to the authoritarian politics of media freedom. Figure 3.1 illus-
trates the complete process of censorship for highlighting our contributions vis-a´-vis
the existing literature. Most existing papers only consider the media freedom policy
proposed by dictators, but neglect 1) the existence of interim censorship which enables
the dictators to deviate from the announced media freedom policy and 2) the me-
1This is not merely a theoretical speculation. The credible commitment from the government indeed
determines whether journalists are willing to report truthfully. For example, Shawn W. Crispin, a
journalist based in Southeast Asia and a member of the Committee to Protect Journalists, made the
following comment on media freedom in Myanmar:
“What the [Myanmar] government doesn’t understand is how professional reporting happens. If
they want to get the truth out, they need to open everything up, let reporters in, and let them
publish what they find ... They’re not doing that, and everyone knows they won’t have a shred of
credibility until they do.”
quoted from “Myanmar Government under Suu Kyi Cracks Down on Journalists,” Associated Press,
February 15, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-press/
private-dailies-re-emerge-in-myanmar-face-difficulties-idUSBRE93007320130401.
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dia’s strategic reporting behavior. We consider interim censorship an important stage
of the complete process of censorship. For instance, in contemporary China, cen-
sorship guidelines are circulated weekly from the Communist Party’s propaganda
department and the government’s Bureau of Internet Affairs to prominent editors
and media providers. The editors then self-regulate the reports. For the Internet
platforms, the government screens the posts by the Great Firewall before publication.
However, the rather opaque guidelines allow authorities, such as the provincial or
municipal information offices, “to crack down on news stories by claiming that they
expose state secrets and endanger the country” after their publication (Xu and Albert,
2017). As a result, we observe episodes, for instance, the former Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao actively urged the media to “fully play their oversight role” and help combat
corruption, but those news outlets that actually uncovered scandals were usually
punished by the government afterwards (Stern and Hassid, 2012: 1239). In the USSR,
the Glavlit executed censorship following the censorship instructions and regulations
proposed by the central government, but they also made decisions based on the ide-
ological line of the Communist Party. Published works could be retracted under the
Glavlit’s discretion post-publishing and before distribution (Lauk, 1999). Despite the
importance of the interim censorship, Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015) (called as SB
(2015) in Figure 3.1) is the only exception in the political economy literature that an-
alyzes the interim censorship and its subsequent commitment problem. We model
censorship with the process close to theirs, but explicitly consider the media outlet as
a strategic actor.
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Figure 3.1: Process of censorship
The dictator proposes
the censorship policy
The media outlet decides
whether to report truthfully
The media outlet reports news The media outlet reports news
The dictator decides
whether to censor news
(interim censorship)
The public receives news
This paper
Other papers
SB (2015)
As such, we are able to formalize the concept of self-censorship by the media.
Our baseline model establishes that self-censorship by the media is not equivalent
to censorship operated by the dictators. Hence, media freedom under dictatorships
can only improve their governance and stability by collecting more information when
dictators can credibly commit to no censorship and avoid self-censorship. The exten-
sions of the basic model contextualize the dictator’s commitment problem in various
different scenarios. First, when regime survival is less vulnerable to media informa-
tion or when dictators can even manipulate it to their favor, counterintuitively, our
model finds that their regimes might not be made stabler by doing so since they
could even be more blinded by media outlets’ self-censorship. Second, from the me-
dia’s perspective, understanding what constitutes threatening news to the dictator
is critical for them to know how they should muzzle themselves. This knowledge,
however, is not always unambiguous. Therefore, another extension in our paper re-
laxes the assumption that the distinction between good and bad news is common
knowledge among media outlets. Finally, in the Appendix we show that our results
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remain unchanged when dictators also enjoy access to a separate and private channel
of information.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant
literature and identifies what distinguishes our paper from other studies. Section 3.3
develops a Bayesian game with three actors, the dictator, the media, and the public.
Section 3.4 then presents several extensions based on the baseline model. Section 3.5
discusses how this theoretical analysis helps reinterpret the recent empirical findings
on the censorship policy of the Chinese government. Section 3.6 concludes with a
summary of results and possible avenues for future research.
3.2 Literature Review
To our knowledge, this paper is the first formal analysis on how the dictator’s com-
mitment problem affects the authoritarian politics of media freedom. We develop a
model of truth-reporting under a dictatorship with testable hypotheses. Our paper
makes contributions to various strands of literature on comparative authoritarian-
ism. In addition to the information paucity owing to the lack of mechanisms such
as electoral competition in democracies, the dictatorship literature also finds that dic-
tators tend to suppress negative information about the regime so their challengers
have nothing to count on for coordinating with potential rebels (Hollyer et al. 2015;
Lohnmann,1994). On the empirical front, for instance, King, et al. (2013, 2014, 2017)
investigate how the Chinese government implemented censorship and its strategy
on information manipulation by applying big data techniques. In the formal theory
literature, information manipulation by censorship and propaganda is usually con-
sidered as a policy tool to maintain regime stability and survival (e.g., Guriev and
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Treisman, 2015).
As the conventional wisdom suggests, censorship can be applied to hinder public
coordination (as in the model of Egorov et al., 2009). In a more sophisticated sense,
dictators can strategically choose an optimal level of censorship and propaganda to
mobilize citizens to take an action (e.g., Edmond, 2013; Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014).
We complement this literature by showing that the information paucity under dicta-
torships is not merely caused by the government censorship, but it also arises when
people are too afraid to speak up and censor themselves from revealing the truth.
In this paper, we make it clear when dictators will impose censorship, and the con-
ditions under which the media, anticipating the potential censorship, will “tell the
truth.” As self-censorship is an important but neglected issue in the literature,2 this
paper makes a contribution in providing a theoretical prediction about the charac-
teristics of censored and self-censored information, and discusses the fundamental
problem of authoritarian commitment: How can dictators credibly commit to policies that
may endanger themselves?
Apart from the need to censor unfavorable information, dictators also need the
information about the true level of their regime support in order to assess the regime
strength and fend off revolution threats from below. In the literature, Egorov et al.
(2009), Lorentzen (2014), Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015), and Huang et al. (2016),
have all shown that dictators can sometimes benefit from free media. Empirically, we
do observe that there are different levels of media freedom across autocracies. More-
over, Lorentzen (2014), Huang et al. (2016), and Chen and Xu (2017a, 2017b) develop
formal models to discuss censorship in the Chinese politics. Most of the works cited
2Germanoa and Meier’s (2013) study on self-censorship of commercial media in democracies is
among the few exceptions.
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above, however, do not consider interim censorship. Hence, they assume that once the
government sets a certain level of media freedom, information will be automatically
revealed. They also do not consider how media outlets might strategically respond to
dictators’ policy given the lack of any institutional checks on their power. We argue
that when considering the complete process of censorship (as illustrated in Figure 3.1),
dictators might face a commitment problem that the pre-announced level of censor-
ship may not be honored. Failing to consider dictators’ commitment problem could
be an especially critical issue for the papers assuming that dictators manipulate infor-
mation by Bayesian persuasion (e.g., Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014; Chen and Xu, 2017a),
as such technology requires dictators to commit to a particular media freedom policy.
In the literature, Myerson (2008) and Svolik (2012) scrutinize the commitment
problem on power building and power sharing in autocratic regime. Our analysis
is the first attempt focusing on the commitment problem on media freedom. With
regard to this discussion, Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015) is the most closely related
paper to our project as we both recognize the existence of interim censorship and dis-
cuss the dictator’s commitment problem to optimal amount of censorship. However,
just as the bulk of literature in this field, their model focuses exclusively on dicta-
tors’ decision over censorship and the media are entirely nonstrategic. Moreover, the
dictator in their model does not face the informational problem that we focus on.
In addition to investigating the dictator’s commitment problem, we further engage
our formal analyses with other studies on media freedom. Specifically, we analyze
whether the dictator’s commitment problem is mitigated or deteriorates when other
determinants of media freedom are also incorporated into our baseline model. First,
previous studies argue that dictators allow freedom of speech to enhance regime
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stability (Chen and Xu, 2017a). Yet, we show that it is more difficult for dictators
in stable regimes to overcome the commitment problem than their counterparts in
unstable regimes. In addition, we consider the role of propaganda under dictator-
ships. When a dictator has the capacity of manipulating information via propaganda
(Huang 2015; Qin et al. 2017), the media’s expectation of being censored would in-
duce them to self-censor in the first place. Furthermore, we consider the case in
which the dictator has heterogeneous preferences toward different issues reported by
the media. For instance, the dictator may allow the media to report misbehavior of
local officials (e.g., Egorov et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2016), but they may not want the
media to report negative news against the central government (Qin et al. 2017).
3.3 Model
We consider a one-period model with three actors: a dictator A, a media outlet M,
and the public P. There are two states of the world: good or bad (ω ∈ {B, G}). The
prior probability for the state being bad is Pr(ω = B) = p.
The media outlet has a private signal s ∈ {b, g} about the state of the world. The
precision of the media outlet’s information is q, meaning that Pr(s = g|ω = G) =
Pr(s = b|ω = B) = q. We set q ∈ (12 , 1] such that the media signal is informative in
a straightforward way. The media outlet reports a piece of news m : {b, g} → {b, g}.
Without loss of generality, we restrict the media outlet’s options to reporting either a
positive or negative piece of news.
The dictator decides whether to censor the report or not (c ∈ {0, 1}). Formally, the
dictator’s strategy is a mapping from m to actions: c : {b, g} → {0, 1}. Censorship
costs k to the dictator.
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The media outlet wants to report truthfully and not to be censored. Thus the
media outlet’s utility is R if it reports truthfully (m(s) = s) and is 0 if it reports
untruthfully (m(s) 6= s), where R > 0.3 If the dictator censors the report, the media
outlet incurs a cost (punishment) K. To exclude trivial results, we set R− K < 0.
Hence the utility of the media outlet UM is:
UM = R1{m(s)=s} − Kc.
If there is no censorship, the public learn the news report (mˆ = m) with probability
β. With probability 1− β, the public fail to learn the news report (mˆ = ∅). β can
depend on the penetration of the media outlet, the quality of news broadcasting
system of a country, and can also be understood as the public’s intention toward
acquiring political information.4
For the baseline model, we analyze a censorship technology such that once imple-
mented, the public will not learn the report.5 We will discuss a powerful information
manipulation technology that can move posteriors further as an extension. The state
of the world is realized at the end, so are the payoffs of the dictator and the media
outlet.
The dictator may suffer a damage in two ways, from the public’s reaction against
a negative report or from the realization of the bad state of the world. An example
for the former can be the damage from public protests against local corruption, and
for the latter can be the loss from the misconducts of corrupt bureaucrats.
3We only need to require R to be slightly greater than 0, so that, ceteris paribus, the media outlet
prefers telling the truth to lying.
4β must be less than 1, otherwise the public can infer that no news is bad news, because no news
can only happen when bad news is reported but censored. If so, censorship is not useful anymore. In
reality, the public are not going to read all the news reported.
5We assume that censorship is always successful and the state of the world is always realized.
Relaxing these assumptions does not change any results qualitatively.
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To highlight the strategic interaction between the dictator and the media outlet,
we do not explicitly model the collective action problem of the public. Since it has
been well-established in the literature that a publicly broadcasted signal, here the bad
news, can facilitate collective actions, among them protests (see, for example, Dewan
and Myatt, 2007, 2008, and Casper and Tyson, 2014), we build upon this literature
and treat ordinary citizens, i.e., news receivers, as a unitary representative actor.
By protesting against the government, the public can enjoy a utility Y once the
action is successful, e.g., forcing the dictator to make some concessions on an issue.
The utility from a non-successful action is normalized to 0. The cost for the action is
E. Suppose the protest is going to succeed when the state of the world is bad. For-
mally, the public decides whether to protest f : {b, g} → {0, 1}. The public’s utility
function UP is thus:
UP =
{
Pr(ω = B)Y− E if f = 1,
0 if f = 0.
Whenever there is a public protest, the dictator suffers a damage. If there is no
public protest, the state of the world is realized at the end of the game. The dictator
suffers a damage once the realized state is bad. The utility function of the dictator
UA is therefore:
UA = −D(m, f = 1,ω) f − D(m, f = 0,ω = B)(1− f )− kc.
We impose the following assumptions:
Assumption 1:
−D(m = b, f = 1,ω) = −D(m = b, f = 0,ω = B) ≡ −Db
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and
−D(m = g, f = 1,ω) = −D(m = g, f = 0,ω = B) ≡ −Dg.
This means we do not differentiate the damages resulted from a protest or a realiza-
tion of the state of the world. The damage severity only depends on the information
received by the dictator, and the two possible values are denoted as −Db and −Dg.
This assumption helps simplify the exposition and analysis significantly, but does not
lead to any loss of interesting result.6
Assumption 2:
Dg > Db.
A piece of bad news from the media outlet serves as a warning message that enables
the autocrat to respond to a challenge better. For example, a news report could give
the dictator a heads-up for where an upcoming insurrection might take place. Hence,
the damage severity is smaller when receiving the negative report from the media
outlet.7
Assumption 3:
D(m, f = 0,ω = G) = 0.
This means if the good state is realized and f = 0, there is no damage for the dictator.
Table 3.1 summarizes the damages the dictator suffers in different situations.
6Differentiating the values of damage from the public protest and the realization of the state of
the world does not provide qualitatively interesting result. Similarly, we do not differentiate the −Dg
resulting from a truthful but wrong report and that from a babbling report. Treating them as the
same simplifies the analysis significantly, while interesting results remain. Particularly, if we think
that the damage arising from a protest −D(m = b, f = 1) is greater than that from, for example,
corruption −D(m, f = 0,ω = B), the commitment problem could only be more severe than under our
assumptions.
7Because the media report is informative regarding the state of the world, even when the public
protest is not going to take place, the dictator can still benefit from having the information in order to
better prepare for a possible realization of the bad state of the world.
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Table 3.1: Damages to the dictator depending on the report he receives {m = b,
m = g}
f = 0 f = 1
ω = B {−Db, −Dg} {−Db, −Dg}
ω = G {0, 0} {−Db, −Dg}
In summary, the game proceeds as follows (Figure 3.2 is the timeline of the game):
1. N decides the state of the world (ω ∈ {B, G}) and reveals a signal s ∈ {b, g} to M
2. M sends a report m
3. A decides whether to censor the news report
4. If not censored, the public receive the report with probability β
5. The public decide whether to protest
6. If there is a public protest, the game ends and payoffs are realized
7. If there is no public protest, the state of the world and payoffs are realized.
Figure 3.2: Timeline
Nature
ω ∈ {B, G}
M
receiving s and reporting m
A
deciding c
P
receiving mˆ and deciding f
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in pure strate-
gies. We characterize two types of equilibria: truth-reporting equilibrium and self-
censoring equilibrium. A truth-reporting equilibrium means that the media outlet
sends truthful signal m(s) = s, and the other actors update their beliefs about the
state of the world with the report; a self-censoring equilibrium means that the media
outlet always sends a positive signal m(b) = m(g) = g, and the other actors do not
update their beliefs with the report. To avoid discussion of uninteresting equilibria,
weakly dominated strategies are excluded.
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Analysis
We begin the analysis by defining the dictator’s and the public’s posterior beliefs,
supposing the media outlet follows the truth-reporting strategy and the dictator does
not censor the report. The dictator’s posterior belief is denoted as Pr(ω = B|m) = µAm.
The public’s posterior belief is denoted as Pr(ω = B|mˆ) = µPmˆ. There are three
possible posteriors for the public:
Pr(ω = B|mˆ = g) = p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q ≡ µPg ,
Pr(ω = B|mˆ = ∅) = p ≡ µPn ,
Pr(ω = B|mˆ = b) = pqpq+(1−p)(1−q) ≡ µPb .
µPg is the posterior if receiving a truthful positive media report, and µPb is the posterior
if receiving a truthful negative media report, and µPn is when the public do not receive
the information. Given q > 12 , we have µ
P
b > µ
P
n > µ
P
g . Essentially, µPg and µPb are
the lower and upper bound of the posterior possible to form with the media report.
Similarly, we define the posteriors for the dictator:{
Pr(ω = B|m = g) = p(1−q)p(1−q)+(1−p)q ≡ µAg ,
Pr(ω = B|m = b) = pqpq+(1−p)(1−q) ≡ µAb .
We solve this game by supposing truth-reporting equilibrium, and checking if
every player has no incentive to deviate from it. Following backward induction, we
consider the public’s action first. As a protest is only successful when the state of
the world is bad, the public believe that the probability for their protest to succeed is
their posterior µP. Formally, the public decides whether to protest by comparing the
expected payoffs with and without protest:
EUP =
{
µPmˆY− E if f = 1,
0 if f = 0.
As such we can further define a social stability threshold pi = EY . Once µ
P
mˆ > pi, the
public decide to protest against the regime.
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In this section, we assume that µPb ≥ pi > µPn to introduce our main results, and
we discuss the other cases in Section 3.3. When µPb ≥ pi > µPn , the public decide to
protest only after reading a bad news report. Recall that the disutility for the dictator
could come from either the public’s response against a negative report or the real-
ization of the bad state of the world. The negative report is useful for the dictator
as it can help him prepare for challenges and hence decreases subsequent damage.
Censorship, on the other hand, can help him avoid damage brought by the negative
report. As such, suppose truthful equilibrium, we can calculate the utility of the dic-
tator UA in different situations as below:
UA =

0 if m = g and ω = G,
−Dg if m = g and ω = B,
−k if m = b and c = 1 and ω = G,
−Db − k if m = b and c = 1 and ω = B,
−βDb − (1− β)0 = −βDb if m = b and c = 0 and ω = G,
−βDb − (1− β)Db = −Db if m = b and c = 0 and ω = B.
Note that when m = b and c = 0 and ω = G, the expected damage is from the
protest; when m = b and c = 0 and ω = B, the expected damage is from both the
protest and the realization of the bad state of the world.
Ex ante, the dictator may want the media outlet to report truthfully, as a bad report
that serves as a warning message can decrease the damage from −Dg to −Db once
a protest take place or a bad state is realized. Given the prior for the state to be bad
is p, the information value is the difference between the expected payoffs with and
without truthful media reports (suppose censorship is not an option for the dictator).
The former is
Pr(m = b|m(s) = s)(−µAb Db − (1− µAb )βDb)+Pr(m = g|m(s) = s)µAg (−Dg) =
−(1− p− q + 2pq)(µAb Db + (1− µAb )βDb)−(p + q− 2pq)µAg Dg,
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and the latter is
Pr(ω = B)(−Dg) = −pDg.
Hence the information value is
V = pDg − (1− p− q + 2pq)(µAb Db + (1− µAb )βDb)− (p + q− 2pq)µAg Dg
= pq(Dg − Db)− (1− p− q + pq)βDb. (3.1)
When it is greater than 0, the dictator will have incentive to promise media freedom.
However, once the media report a piece of bad news truthfully,8 the dictator must
decide whether to censor the news. The expected payoff for the dictator if not cen-
soring the report is
−βDb︸ ︷︷ ︸
mˆ=b
mˆ=∅,ω=B︷ ︸︸ ︷
−µAb (1− β)Db .9
If he censors the report, the expected payoff is
−k︸︷︷︸
c=1
mˆ=∅,ω=B︷ ︸︸ ︷
−µAb Db .
Overall, the dictator chooses between no censorship and probably suffering an immediate
damage from public protest (−βDb) and committing the costly censorship (−k) and waiting
for the realization of the state of the world. Thus, once (1− µAb )βDb ≥ k, the dictator will
censor a bad report. In other words, the commitment constraint for the dictator to
not censor bad news is
(1− µAb )βDb < k. (3.2)
When the incentive for censorship is positive to the dictator (IC > 0 as shown in
Figure 3.3), he faces the commitment problem.
8We know that whenever the media outlet receives a good signal s = g, it will report this signal
truthfully, so we only need to consider its action when s = b.
9The expected payoff is derived from −βDb− µAb (1− β)Db. The first term is the immediate damage
arising from the public’s reaction against the negative report, and the second term is the damage when
the public do not receive the report but the bad state of the world is eventually realized.
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Figure 3.3: Commitment Problem
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If this constraint is not satisfied, the dictator will censor bad news, and expecting
to be censored, the media outlet will choose self-censorship in advance because R−
K < 0, and the equilibrium is self-censoring. If the commitment constraint is satisfied,
the equilibrium will be truth-reporting instead.10
Proposition 3.3.1. When the information value of truthful reporting V is greater than 0
for the dictator, he benefits from truthful reporting. Nevertheless, he can only commit to not
censoring bad news if (1− µAb )βDb < k (truth-reporting equilibrium: {c=0, m(s)=s}).
When he cannot commit to no censorship, the media outlet does not report truthfully (self-
10One may wonder whether the results are robust once the game is repeated. Suppose an infinitely
repeated game and the dictator can rationally expect the future. At the period one, when he makes
his censorship decisions, reputational concerns have to be taken into account as a component of the
cost for censorship k. Therefore, everything remains almost the same as in the one-shot game, except
that the patience of the dictator also partially determines the cost for censorship.
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censoring equilibrium: {c=1, m=g}).
We therefore know that the severity of the commitment problem is:
1. increasing in β,
2. decreasing in µAb (and hence decreasing in p and q),
3. increasing in Db, and
4. decreasing in k.
The significance of Proposition 3.3.1 is twofold. First of all, the bulk of autocratic
media freedom models in the literature (Egorov et al. 2009; Lorentzen, 2014; Qin et
al., 2017) treat media as a non-strategic actor, and therefore assume away the possibil-
ity of self-censorship. The dictator, however, cannot easily obtain the true information
when he cannot commit himself to not censoring a bad report ex post even if truthful
reporting is valuable to him. In this self-censoring equilibrium, the dictator’s ex-
pected payoff is −pDg. The implication from this result is that, once the commitment
constraint is not satisfied, the media outlet self-censors its reports even if the dictator
openly vows to promote greater media freedom.
Censorship and self-censorship may seem to be very similar in the stylized mod-
els, but the consequences are substantially different. When only considering censor-
ship, as in the existing literature, the theoretical framework assumes that the dictator
can decide his optimal information manipulation strategy, and thus the dictator can
learn the truthful information before deciding whether to censor the report. How-
ever, as our analysis suggests, when self-censorship is involved, the dictator does not
learn the information that is blocked by the media outlet, and, as a result, he cannot
enjoy the information value V.
Second, the comparative statics derived in Proposition 3.3.1 also allow us to make
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various meaningful predictions for future empirical implementations. Analyzing the
constraint, we know that the commitment problem is more severe when: 1) β is
higher, 2) µAb is smaller, 3) Db is larger, and 4) k is smaller. Intuitively, higher β
means that once the media outlet reports bad news, the likelihood for the public to
receive the news is also higher and people know the dictator would have stronger
incentive to impose censorship. It therefore predicts that the dictator has harder
time making a commitment to no censorship when the information transmission
is easier from media to ordinary citizens. With the recent advance in information
and communication technology, the issue of self-censorship in a dictatorship could
therefore be even more salient than ever before.11
Moreover, a smaller µAb gives the autocrat stronger incentive to gamble on the
realization of the state of the world, hoping that the media outlet’s report is a false
alarm. In other words, when the dictator is more uncertain about the true state of
the world ex post, his commitment ability is also undermined. In addition, when
the damage (Db) caused by bad news is more severe, the dictator will certainly have
stronger incentive to censor it. Naturally, it will also make it more difficult for him to
commit to no censorship to media. Finally, since k is the upper bound for Inequality
(3.2), as k gets larger, the range of values for the other parameters can take for the
inequality to be satisfied is also larger, thus strengthening dictator’s commitment
ability.
Corollary 3.3.1. When the information value of truthful reporting for the dictator is positive
and he suffers from the commitment problem, the cost of censorship k can serve as a commit-
ment device. If the transaction cost for adjusting k to a new k∗ (e.g., the cost for introducing
11The prevalence of social media may or may not make censorship per se less effective. On the one
hand, the news contents online could be duplicated and spread rapidly, but on the other hand, as
Crook (2017) argues, they can also be removed more quickly and quietly.
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foreign media) is smaller than the information value of truth-reporting
V = pq(Dg − Db)− (1− p− q + pq)βDb,
the dictator may want to choose the k∗ high enough to induce truth-reporting.
Myerson (2008) suggests that when a dictator faces commitment problem, he has
incentive to tie his hands in order to make his promise credible. Here we discuss
how a dictator could address this commitment problem by making himself less able
to implement censorship. Suppose before the media outlet reports any news, the
dictator can choose the cost of censorship k∗ such that he cannot adjust it back and
forth easily, as long as the cost of setting the parameter is less than the information
value of truthful reporting, it pays for the dictator to use k∗ as a commitment device
for more easily inducing the media to tell the truth. Note that when making this
decision, the dictator and the public have same information (the common prior belief
and other parameters), so changing k does not serve as a signal about the state of the
world to the public.
For example, when Myanmar’s authoritarian government decided to relax its me-
dia control in 2012, not only did it eliminate in August the pre-publication censorship
that had been imposed on Burmese print media for almost 50 years, but it also, in the
following year, formally dissolved the censorship authority, the Press Scrutiny and
Registration Division, and granted publishing licenses to private media—including
“D-Wave,” the official paper of the then opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s Na-
tional League for Democracy (NLD).12 More critically, the government also allowed
12“Chief Censor in Myanmar Caps His Red Pen,” New York Times, September 21, 2013. Retrieved
from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/world/asia/
myanmars-chief-censor-is-closing-his-office.html; “Private Dailies Re-emerge in Myanmar,
Face Difficulties,” Reuters, April 1, 2013. Retrieved from
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-press/
private-dailies-re-emerge-in-myanmar-face-difficulties-idUSBRE93007320130401.
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two foreign media, Associated Press and Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) to
establish local news bureaus in Yangon.13 These new policies brought significant
changes to Myanmar’s media environment. As argued in Corollary 3.3.1, the intro-
duction of the two foreign news agencies could have served as a commitment device
for the dictator, considering the higher cost (k) of censoring them vis-a`-vis domestic
ones. First of all, according to the annual reports published by the Freedom House
before and after the changes, Myanmar’s Freedom of the Press score rose substan-
tially from an embarrassingly poor score of 94 (with 100 being the worst) in 2011 to
70 in 2014.14 Second, while a score of 70 still placed Myanmar’s press freedom in
the category of “Not Free” in 2014, in the subsequent years after the 2012 reform,
local private print media and professional associations for journalists mushroomed
and more “truthful” reports criticizing the government for violating the freedom of
press also became prevalent (Kean, 2017: 150-151). The inclusion of foreign media as
a commitment device in the reform package seems to have made Myanmar’s local
media react more proactively to the government press liberalization and forthcoming
about what they saw on the ground.
Social Stability
Now we generalize the analysis by considering different levels of social stability, i.e.,
different values of pi. Recall that we have three possible posteriors for the public
when on the truth-reporting equilibrium: µPg , µPn , and µPb , and therefore we can divide
a society into four levels of stability by these three posteriors as shown in Figure 3.4.
13“6 Multiformat Journalists to Staff New AP Bureau in Myanmar,” Associated Press, March 30,
2013. Retrieved from https://www.ap.org/press-releases/2013/
6-multiformat-journalists-to-staff-new-ap-bureau-in-myanmar.
14What has to be noted here is that the state of the media freedom in Myanmar has not made any
progress since then. From the most recent Freedom House report (Freedom House, 2017), the score
even went down slightly to 73.
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We call a society highly stable if pi > µPb , which means the dictator will not be hurt
by bad news even when the public receive a truthful negative report. If pi lies in the
interval of µPn and µPb (µ
P
b ≥ pi > µPn ), which means the dictator will be hurt if the
public receive a truthful negative report, we call the society stable. This is essentially
the baseline case. Likewise, we call a society unstable if the autocrat is subject to a
damage unless the public receive a truthful positive report (µPn ≥ pi > µPg ). A society
is highly unstable if the autocrat is always damaged no matter what information the
public receive (µPg ≥ pi).15
Figure 3.4: The location of pi on µP
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When a society is stable (µPb ≥ pi > µPn ), the autocrat can avoid a loss from bad
news by censoring news report once the media outlet produces a negative report as
the censorship could decrease the posterior from µPb to µ
P
n . The dictator’s censorship
decision is based on Inequality (3.2).
Figures 3.5-3.8 illustrate the impact of dictator’s action on the public’s posterior
belief in different scenarios. The public’s posterior beliefs with circle indicate the
tipping points for the public’s protest decisions. The solid arrows indicate the effects
of the dictator’s information manipulation technology and the public’s decisions on
protest will be changed subsequently; the dashed arrows, on the other hands, are
the cases that, although the dictator can manipulate the public’s posterior beliefs, but
15One may ask why, when the society is highly unstable, the dictator still needs information to
prepare for an upcoming challenge when he already anticipates it is going to happen for sure. A
rationale could be, when there are many localities where the crisis could take place and the dictator
does not know exactly which is the hotspot, the media report provides this information to him.
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cannot change the decisions on protest.
Figure 3.5: The incentive for censorship when a society is stable
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On the other hand, when a society is unstable (µPn ≥ pi > µPg ), changing µPb to µPn
is not useful, as the dictator will be hurt when either bad news or no news is received
by the public.
Figure 3.6: The incentive for censorship when a society is unstable
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Thus we know that when the dictator can only attempt to decrease the posterior
from µPb to µ
P
n , the commitment problem only arises when the society is stable. When
the society is unstable, highly stable or highly unstable, information manipulation is
not helpful, and thus the dictator can commit not to censoring any news report.
Proposition 3.3.2. If the dictator’s information manipulation technology can only decrease
the posterior from µPb to µ
P
n , the commitment problem arises when the society is stable (µPb ≥
pi > µPn ).
3.4 Extensions
Censorship with Propaganda
Now suppose the dictator can engage in a strong censorship technology which can
turn a negative report to a positive one (changing m = b to m = g16), i.e., by pro-
16The public will not receive the bad news for sure, but the probability for them to read the good
news is again β.
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paganda. For example, Stockmann and Gallagher (2011) suggest that the Chinese
government could turn a disaster to a positive message to stabilize the regime by pro-
paganda. If this information manipulation technology is successfully implemented,
the public will not learn the negative report and will receive a positive report instead.
That is, now the dictator has the ability to turn the posterior from µPb to µ
P
g .
Figure 3.7: The incentive for censorship when a society is stable
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Figure 3.8: The incentive for censorship when a society is unstable
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From Figures 3.7 and 3.8 above, it is clear that now the dictator faces the commit-
ment problem not only when the society is stable, but also when it is unstable. That
is, with a stronger capacity in manipulating information, the commitment problem is
now more severe.
Without truthful reporting, the public always protest, and the payoff for the dic-
tator is −Dg, because he is not aware where the problem is. Suppose truthful equi-
librium, the utility of the dictator UA in different situations as below:
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UA =

−(1− β)Dg if m = g and ω = G,
−Dg if m = g and ω = B,
−(1− β)Db − k if m = b and c = 1 and ω = G,
−Db − k if m = b and c = 1 and ω = B,
−Db if m = b and c = 0 and ω = G,
−Db if m = b and c = 0 and ω = B.
Without censorship, the ex ante value of truthful reporting is
Vu = Dg − (1− p− q + 2pq)Db − (p + q− 2pq)(βµAg + (1− β))Dg.17 (3.3)
Recall that in an unstable society, the dictator suffers the damage unless the public
receive a credible good report. When the media outlet reports a negative piece of
news, if it is not censored, the payoff is −Db. If the dictator censors the news and
reverts it to be a positive report, the payoff is
µAb︸︷︷︸
ω=B
mˆ∈{∅,g}︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−Db) + (1− µAb )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ω=G
mˆ=∅︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−(1− β)Db) −k︸︷︷︸
c=1
.
The commitment constraint for no censorship is thus
(1− µAb )βDb < k,
which is the same as when the society is stable (Inequality 3.2).18
We conclude the above discussion in Proposition 3.4.1.
Proposition 3.4.1. If the dictator’s information manipulation technology is moving µPb to
µPg , the commitment problem arises not only when the society is stable (µPb ≥ pi > µPn ) but
also when it is unstable (µPn ≥ pi > µPg ).
By comparing the values of truthful reporting, V and Vu, we can find that a dic-
tator with a strong capability in information manipulation is more willing to commit
17Because when the society is unstable, the dictator suffers the damage whenever the public does
not receive a credible positive news report. See the proof of Corollary 2 for details.
18The dictator compares the same expected payoffs from censorship and no censorship in both cases.
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to no censorship when the society is unstable than when the society is stable. This
is because, in a unstable society, the dictator is not only more in need of a warning
message, a credible positive report can also “correctly guide public opinion” (Dim-
itrov, 2017). In other words, committing to no censorship is particularly beneficial
for the dictator when the society is unstable, as an informative negative signal helps
the dictator to prepare for the upcoming challenge and a promising positive signal is
needed to diffuse public grievance.
Corollary 3.4.1. Given Vu > V for all possible parameter values, a dictator with a strong
capability in information manipulation is more willing to commit to no censorship when the
society is unstable than when the society is stable.
Proof. See the appendix.
We focus our discussion on the cases in which the society is either stable or unsta-
ble. It is because when the society is highly stable, the dictator would not be hurt by
negative reports, and accordingly, the dictator has no incentive to censor them. Sim-
ilarly, the dictator will not censor any news in a highly unstable society and should
commit to not censoring any reports to ensure truthful reporting and minimize any
potential damages. The key difference between a stable society from an unstable
one is that the dictator in the former does not need any positive news to sustain his
legitimacy.
Recognizing this difference clarifies the relationships between the severity of the
commitment problem and 1) the dictator’s capability in information manipulation and
2) his willingness to commit to no censorship. The dictator in an unstable society suf-
fers the commitment problem only when he is more able to manipulate information.
However, as he needs positive reports to boost his legitimacy, in an unstable society,
74
he is more willing to commit to no censorship to convince media outlets not to self-
censor than when in a stable society. Otherwise self-censorship leads to the babbling
equilibrium in which any positive reports are useless in convincing the public. It
turns out that, due to the dictator’s lower willingness to commit to no censorship, the
regime in a stable society could suffer more severe damage once the true state of the
world is bad.19
This finding suggests that social instability is an important determinant of the dic-
tator’s willingness to commit to media freedom. The case of Taiwan provides an
illustrating example to this point. After the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, some
liberal intellectuals affiliated with it published a fortnightly periodical, Free China
Review. With the goal of anti-communism, Free China Review was employed by the
government to propagandize its support for liberal democratic values in order to
earn political and economic sponsorship from the U.S. At the same time, Free China
Review commented on domestic political and economic issues to challenge the KMT’s
authoritarian rule (Rigger, 1999: 104). The outbreak of the Korean War in the early
1950s consolidated the relationship between the KMT and the U.S. As Taiwans so-
ciety was more stabilized, the KMT was less willing to accept criticisms raised by
liberal intellectuals. Eventually, in 1960, the government shut down Free China Review
and arrested Lei Zhen, a prominent member of its editorial board, who was jailed
for ten years. The arrest of Lei Zhen also “put to rest any lingering doubts about the
regime’s willingness to suppress its critics” (Rigger, 1999: 106).
19This point could be related to Kuran (1991) about why the collapse of “stable” East European com-
munist regimes, where “people routinely applauded speakers whose message they disliked, joined
organizations whose mission they opposed” (26), was so surprising. The realization of the true state
of the world that initiated the whole event was, however, rather hard to be identified, as Kuran con-
tends: “What specific events set the revolutionary bandwagon in motion? One must recognize that
attempting to answer this question is akin to trying to identify the spark that ignited a forest fire or
the cough responsible for a flu epidemic” (37).
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It was not until the late 1980s that the government committed to media freedom to
rebuild its legitimacy. As the opposition force challenged the authoritarian rules via
social movements during the late 1980s, the KMT also faced internal power struggle.
In addition, many core party members were involved in political and economic scan-
dals that hurt the KMT’s legitimacy, such as the government-ordered assassination
of Henry Liu in the U.S. and the bank run of the Tenth Credit Cooperation of Taipei
(Hsiung 1986; Nathan and Ho 1993). As a result, in a meeting with the chairperson of
the Washington Post in 1986, President Chiang announced that the KMT government
would repeal the martial law and lift the ban on parties and media. Subsequently, the
number of registered newspapers increased from 31 to 122 in 1988, and the govern-
ment no longer censored news reports. In short, the social instability induced KMT
to commit to media freedom that it hoped could help regain its reputation.
Selective Authoritarian Responsiveness
In this section, we return to the baseline model but allow the dictator to choose be-
tween actively addressing the problem raised by the media, censoring the negative
report, or not taking any action at all. This extension goes beyond the recent idea
of “responsive authoritarianism”, of which China is often regarded as an example
(Huang et al., 2016; Chen and Xu, 2017b), in making the dictator’s responsiveness
to (social) problems a choice variable. Among all the issues the dictator could en-
counter, some of them are softer than the others, and the determinants could be, for
example, the relationship between the dictator and the officials concerned with re-
gard to a particular problem, or the nature of the problem. It is well-known that the
Chinese government is particularly responsive to environmental issues but still some
of them are more politically sensitive and are stalled in the Chinese government’s
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policy agenda.20
There are therefore two twists to the baseline model. First, the dictator now must
simultaneously decide 1) if the report should be censored, and 2) if the issue should
be addressed. We denote the latter decision as r ∈ {0, 1}. Second, the dictator has
preferences over addressing some issues more than the others. Formally, denote the
type of issues i ∈ {L, H}. The dictator will get a disutility −Dr if addressing such
issues (i = H) undermines his power base. On the other hand, dealing with the
issues that push the balance to the dictator’s favor (i = L) will give him a payoff
−Dr + e. For example, the dictator might use media reports as a justification to purge
a political enemy from the government. Overall, for the dictator, addressing type-H
issues is more costly than addressing type-L issues. When e > Dr, the reform can
even yield positive payoff for the dictator.
The dictator sets the priority for his (policy/reform) agenda, while the media
outlet does not know it precisely. The media outlet is aware of the probability for
a specific issue belonging to type H is Pr(i = H) = α. Formally the dictator’s
strategy is a mapping from i and m to actions: c : {L, H} × {b, g} → {0, 1} and
r : {L, H} × {b, g} → {0, 1}. Overall, the tuple of strategies for the dictator is Xi :
{b, g} → {0, 1}2, and we collect Xi as X = {XL, XH}. For the media outlet, it makes its
reporting decision after observing α, conditional on its anticipation of the dictator’s
action. Other things remain the same as in the baseline model. Figure 3.9 is the
20For instance, in a 2006 report the Eurasia Group prepared for the US-China Economic and Secu-
rity Review Commission, we see how some of the issues (reforms) were removed from the Chinese
government’s policy agenda owing to certain political complications.
“While recent reforms to China’s energy regulation structure will undoubtedly change the dy-
namics of bureaucratic decision-making, ..... top-level attention to energy issues has not helped
the government to overcome turf wars between different ministries, and China’s domestic energy
reform, such as liberalizing pricing, remains bogged down by political sensitivities.” (6-7)
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timeline of the game.
Figure 3.9: Timeline
Nature
ω ∈ {L, H} × {B, G}
M
receiving s and
reporting m
A
deciding c and r
P
receiving mˆ and
deciding f
The payoffs for the dictator given different actions when m = b is summarized as
Table 3.2:
Table 3.2: UA when m = b
Xi = {ci, ri} i = L i = H
Xi = {0, 0} −µAb Db − (1− µAb )βDb −µAb Db − (1− µAb )βDb
Xi = {1, 0} −µAb Db − k −µAb Db − k
Xi = {0, 1} −Dr + e −Dr
Xi = {1, 1} −Dr + e− k −Dr − k
It is clear that {1, 1} is dominated by {0, 1}. By comparing the payoffs of the
dictator between whether to address an issue and censor a bad report depending on
issue types, we characterize the dictator’s best responses in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: The dictator’s best responses
X = {cL, rL, cH , rH} Conditions
XA = {1, 0, 1, 0} (1), (3)
XB = {0, 1, 1, 0} (1), (4), (5)
XC = {0, 1, 0, 1} (6), (7)
XD = {0, 1, 0, 0} (2), (8), (9)
XE = {0, 0, 0, 0} (2), (10)
Note: Conditions: (1) (1− µAb )βDb > k; (2) (1− µAb )βDb < k; (3) k + e < Dr − µAb Db; (4) k + e > Dr − µAb Db; (5) k < Dr −
µAb Db; (6) k > Dr − µAb Db; (7) µAb Db + (1− µAb )βDb > Dr ; (8) µAb Db + (1− µAb )βDb < Dr ; (9) µAb Db + (1− µAb )βDb + e > Dr ;
(10) µAb Db + (1− µAb )βDb + e < Dr .
When expecting the dictator to choose XA, the media outlet will self-censor its
report because the expected payoff for the news outlet is R− K < 0. That is, when
reporting a bad news, none of the issues will be addressed but a report will be
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censored for sure. If XC, XD, or XE is expected, the media outlet will truthfully
report its information because the dictator can commit himself not to censoring news
reports in this case.
When XB is expected, the result is more interesting. In this case, the media outlet
will report truthfully when α < RK . As the media outlet cannot perfectly recognize
whether an issue is among those the dictator is willing to address, the media outlet
might report something unwanted by the dictator and conceals something wanted.
It is worth noting that this is not a media outlet’s mixed strategy, as the origin of
this strategy is not the dictator’s indifference between censoring and not censoring
a report, but the media outlet’s uncertainty about the dictator’s preference on the
issues.
By combining the conditions for the dictator’s best responses above, we can sum-
marize the equilibria as Table 3.4 and Proposition 3.4.2.
Table 3.4: Equlibria
X Equlibrium
XA Self-censoring
XB Truth-reporting when α < RK
XC, XD, XE Truth-reporting
Proposition 3.4.2. When k < min{Dr− µAb Db− e, (1− µAb )βDb}, the media outlet always
self-censors its report (self-censoring).
When Dr − µAb Db − e < k < min{Dr − µAb Db, (1− µAb )βDb}, the media outlet reports
truthfully when α < RK ; when α ≥ RK , the media outlet self-censors its report (truth-reporting
with some censorship).
For other possible parameter values, the media outlet reports truthfully (truth-reporting with
no censorship).
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3.5 Empirical Implications
In addition to deriving useful comparative statics for understanding the relationship
between dictator’s commitment constraint and media outlets’ strategic behavior from
the propositions above, our formal analysis also helps advance the recent empirical
research on the censorship under dictatorships. For example, in one of their seminal
studies on the Chinese internet censorship,21 King et al. (2013) use a data-driven
method to find that ”posts are censored if they are in a topic area with collective
action potential and not otherwise” (13). However, they also note that
...our methodology reveals a great deal about the goals of the Chinese leadership,
but it misses self-censorship and censorship that may occur before we are able to
obtain the post in the first place. (5)
In our theoretical framework, the observed information in their study belongs to ei-
ther “not self-censored but censored” (from the truth-reporting with some censorship
equilibrium) or “not censored” (from the truth-reporting with no censorship equilib-
rium) categories. If the data truncation was random, their conclusion reached by
counting “not self-censored but censored” posts on the social media would not be
biased. However, as our model shows, the truncation caused by self-censorship was
very likely to be a result of the media’s (or netizens’) strategic behavior, and therefore
was anything but random. As the following analysis is going to show, our empirical
contributions can be easily explicated through a simple model of sample selectivity.22
21What is worth noting here is that our arguments can also travel to the behavior on social media.
While the information disclosed by social media users can be valuable to the dictator, it can also easily
fall prey to his censorship given its potential for facilitating contentious collective actions even among
non-users (Little, 2016). Naturally, just as traditional media, social media users will also self-censor
themselves in the presence of the dictator’s commitment problem.
22Given the limit on paper length, please see Appendix for a more formal discussion of how our
model can help address the sample selectivity in King et al. (2013) and an extension using EM algo-
rithm to deal with the issue of missing information on self-censored messages.
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Specifically, the comparative statics derived from our theoretical model can make
it relatively easy to specify a function for the determinants of one’s self-censorship
behavior since the commitment constraint shown in our model can all be viewed as is-
sue and media outlet specific. From a Maximum Likelihood Estimation perspective,
this simple statistical model also allows us to derive a full log-likelihood function.
More importantly, the parameters in the following discussion are all observables.
Consider that the equilibrium conditions characterized above are specific to each
issue and each media outlet.23 From Proposition 3.4.2, we know that when k <
min{Dr − µAb Db − e, (1− µAb )βDb}, the media outlet self-censors the information and
this kind of information is thus not observed in King et al. (2013).24 When Dr −
µAb Db − e < k < min{Dr − µAb Db, (1− µAb )βDb}, the media outlet reports truthfully
when α < RC . Some of the reports however will be censored. They are the censored
information observed by King et al. (2013). Those reported on the truth-reporting
equilibrium path should also have been observed in their data. Analyzing the condi-
tions further, we can categorize the following situations:
Table 3.5: Empirical implication
Situations Censorship observable?
A. (a) < (b) and (b) < (c) Some censorship observed when (a) < k < (b)
B. (a) < (b) and (c) < (b) Some censorship observed when (a) < k < (c)
C. (b) < (a) No censorship observed
(information either self-censored or not censored)
Note: Denote (a) = Dr − µAb Db − e, (b) = (1− µAb )βDb, (c) = Dr − µAb Db
23Extending our model to explain the behavior of multiple media outlets is straightforward and
even their interactions do not really concern us. This is because the media outlet only cares about its
own behavior and the dictator’s reaction to its reports. Strategic interactions between the news outlets
could be interesting for future research.
24In the model, we assume that the media outlet must report a piece of news, and therefore, it self-
censors its information by sending out a positive report. In reality, the self-censoring media outlet can
choose to remain silent. In either case, the true information obtained by the media outlet is concealed
and hence not observable by researchers.
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The reports that are not self-censored but censored are either from Situation A
or B. In Situation A, the media outlets anticipate that some information might be
censored once reported but they have a sufficiently strong belief that the dictator
would address the related problems, so they do not self-censor their reports. In
Situation B, the commitment constraint (3.2) does not hold for all issues, but again
the media outlets believe the dictator might welcome their truthful information in
order to address social problems, and hence may still publish the news. In Situation
C, the dictator is not going to carry out any reforms. Hence, the media outlets make
reporting decisions based on the commitment constraint (3.2). No reports that were
censored and observed by King et al. (2013) belong to this category, as the information
is either self-censored or not censored at all.
It turns out that the reports which are not self-censored but censored (from Situa-
tion A or B in Table 3.5) might well be those the dictator potentially has incentive to
address. Then it is not surprising that they are highly likely to have “collective action
potential,” since the collective actions that can be provoked explicitly online tend to
aim at asking for policy reforms. While some mild government criticisms could sat-
isfy the commitment constraint (belonging to Situation C in Table 3.5), serious ones
related to long-held political taboos such as 1989 Tiananmen Square protests would
have been self-censored in advance if the media do not expect the government will
address them. In other words, instead of allowing all kinds of government criticisms,
the existence of censorship stifles most serious types even before they can be seen.
This then gives rise to a potential issue of sample selection where observable data
only contain the politically admissible criticisms.
The analysis above provides a potentially fruitful way to move forward the re-
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search agenda set by King et al.’s (2013) paper. Based on the variations in the mea-
surable characteristics of the media outlets, a fuller picture of missing information
because of self-censorship could be reconstructed. With a better understanding of
the information environment, researchers then can more correctly infer the dictator’s
censorship strategy.
3.6 Conclusion
The recent rise of scholarly interests in comparative authoritarianism finds that there
is a wide range of variation in media freedom in dictatorships. Yet, this line of re-
search assumes that the media will report truthfully when the dictator sets a policy
to allow for the media freedom. Most papers, apart from Shadmehr and Bernhardt
(2015), do not consider the fact that the dictator can hide a piece of news before it
reaches the public by interim censorship. Moreover, existing studies treat the media
as a non-strategic actor, thus assuming away the possibility of their strategic self-
censorship. This paper takes issue with this assumption and develops a game theo-
retic model to investigate the strategic interaction among the dictator, the media, and
the public.
We study determinants for the dictator to successfully commit media freedom
without inducing self-censorship of the media. As the dictator can always punish the
media outlet for truthful reports that may humiliate or even destabilize the regime,
his proposal to media freedom may not be credible. Accordingly, we demonstrate
that the commitment problem could prevent the media from “telling the truth” even
when the dictator has a clear demand for truthful information. The dictator fails
to gain the potential information value due to media self-censorship. This is a key
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difference between censorship and self-censorship, because when deciding whether
to censor a report, the dictator would still learn the information; when the media
outlet self-censors its report, the dictator is not able to learn the information.
The commitment problem becomes more severe under when: 1) there is higher
quality of information transmission or the public have a higher intention to acquire
political information, 2) if the dictator has a stronger ability of manipulating infor-
mation to his favor (e.g., propaganda). Due to the self-censorship induced by the
commitment problem, it is very likely that total amount of information censored
should be much more than the observed amount as the recent studies claim.
Our analysis further argues that, when in a stable society, a dictator faces a more
serious information insufficiency due to the commitment problem. Nevertheless, it
also demonstrates that the dictator may have incentive to commit to no censorship,
especially when the society is unstable. Making censorship more costly can serve
as a commitment device, which can be achieved by, for example, introducing foreign
media into the country. In addition, uncertainty about whether the dictator welcomes
a truthful report leads to situations that unwanted reports are reported and desirable
information is self-censored.
Our results provide both theoretical and empirical implications. Theoretically,
our results point out that the dictator’s commitment problem is much more sub-
stantially important than it was assumed in previous studies of authoritarian media
politics. In particular, the dictator’s information insufficiency should be much more
severe than previously expected when considering self-censorship. Future studies
should consider this commitment problem when investigating the emergence and
determinants of media freedom in dictatorships. Empirically, our findings suggest
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that further investigation on the linkage between censorship and self-censorship can
advance the understanding of authoritarian media politics. Current studies delineate
the preferences of authoritarian governments to policies or governance by collecting
the censored information (before it is censored). Yet, the self-censored information
may be more critical to the dictator, because the contents are probably more sensi-
tive and (or) the information outlets are with higher quality or penetration. Future
empirical studies may endeavor to identify the media’s self-censored information in
order to infer the dictator’s censorship strategy correctly with a more holistic picture
of missing information in autocracies.
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Chapter 4
Reputation and Media Selection
“The sinister fact about literary censorship in England is that it is largely voluntary . . . . So
far as the daily newspapers go, this is easy to understand. The British press is extremely
centralized, and most of it is owned by wealthy men who have every motive to be dishonest
on certain important topics.”
— George Orwell, Orwell’s Proposed Preface to Animal Farm
4.1 Introduction
The prevalence of low-quality news contents, particularly the so-called “fake news”
has become a growing concern in democracies. This issue is considered to be severely
problematic, to the extent that “it was alleged that fake news might have been pivotal
in the election of President Trump” (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017: 232). This phe-
nomenon has been attributed to the relatively low barrier to enter the news market
nowadays. Thus, an intuitive way to address this problem is to fact-check news and
correct the rumors.
Fact-checking, however, is not without problem. The number of reports to be
checked is high. People may doubt the neutrality of fact checkers. Research also
shows that fact-checkers tend to disagree among themselves (Lim, 2018). Moreover,
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corrections against rumors “frequently fail to reduce misperceptions” and can back-
fire (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). Hence, alternatively, some scholars and public intellec-
tuals suggest that providing the audience reputational information of the media out-
lets could help them correctly choose news sources and discipline the media. There
are already organizations, such as the Trust Project, beginning to provide this kind of
quality evaluation. In early 2019, Microsoft starts providing ratings on the quality of
news outlets in its Edge mobile browser via an add-on named “NewsGuard.”1
The logic of this suggested solution is quite straightforward. If an objective quality
information is provided to the audience, it is believed that they can select news outlets
wisely, and the news providers can also be disciplined to provide reports of good-
quality. This follows directly from the reputation effect characterized by Kreps and
Wilson (1982).
This logic, however, is incomplete. Provision of reputational information makes
some media outlets more influential than the rest. Because, unlike the reputation of
individuals, the reputation of firms is tradable (Tadelis, 1999 and 2002), providing
reputational information to consumers create a new dimension of strategic consid-
eration which can be exploited by interested parties. The latter may have incentives
to own the news outlets with established reputation in order to manipulate pub-
lic opinion quickly and effectively effectively. This paper aims at investigating the
promised positive effects brought by provision of reputational information building
on the framework originally proposed by Tadelis (1999 and 2002).
In this framework, interested parties can establish new media outlets or take over
the existing ones to engage in political persuasion and information manipulation.
1See the following webpage for how Microsoft rates the news outlets:
https://www.newsguardtech.com/ratings/rating-process-criteria/.
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When consumers know nothing about the media outlets, all the media outlets are
considered equal. When the consumers learn the reputations of the outlets, the out-
lets are differentiated, some are more popular, and hence more profitable and more
influential, than the others. That is, reputation is important for the media outlets to
be “powerful”. While some new entrants have built up their own with struggle, it
is common that interested parties choose to takeover the established and reputable
news outlets and altered their editorial policies. For example, Hong Kong newspa-
pers taken over by pro-Beijing corporations or sponsored by the Chinese government
have changed their political stances significantly. According to some content analy-
ses, those newspapers “lent overwhelm support to Beijing with almost no news items
favorable the democrats” and the editors tend to work as gatekeepers by removing
contents positive to the democrats and manipulating the headlines “to the extent that
they did not match the stories” (Ngok, 2007: 963-967).
This kind of episodes also happens in consolidated democracies. In 2011, Swiss
newspaper Basler Zeitung was purchased by Christoph Blocher, a prominent figure
of the rightwing Swiss People’s Party. This transaction was intentionally kept se-
cret at the beginning through an indirect ownership of his daughter and he denied
this transaction for months after it was eventually confirmed. This transaction was
accused to be a political plot of the Party.2 The London Evening Standard is said to
begin favoring more conservative positions after purchased by Russian businessman
and former KGB agent Alexander Lebedev. In a report by Media Reform Coalition
and Goldsmiths, University of London, the newspaper was criticized for being biased
against Labour Party’s Sadiq Khan in coverage of the 2016 London Mayoral Election
2Newspaper takeover reveals rightwing strategy.
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/newspaper-takeover-reveals-rightwing-strategy/31752732
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campaigns.3 More recently, President Trump also accused the Washington Post, which
is owned by Amazon, a lobbyist for the Internet company.4 In a recent study, Martin
and McCrain (2019) show that, after bought by the right-wing broadcasting group
Sinclair, the news coverage of many local stations in the US have turned conservative.
They further show that, while there exists a small decline in viewership at those sta-
tions, “the vast majority of viewers watching before the acquisition date continued to
watch afterwards, despite the substantial changes in political content” (20).
This paper introduces a new theoretical framework to evaluate the impact of rep-
utation on the media market and the effect of potential market regulations on social
welfare. Apart from adding new insights to the discussion of media market regula-
tion, this paper argues that exerting influence on consumers information by media
ownership is not only a feasible strategy in autocracies. It is possible even in a com-
petitive media market. Moreover, providing the audience reputational information
is not likely to eliminate the existence of biased media outlets. Finally, the analysis
shows that, while banning all the transactions of media ownerships may not be so-
cially optimal, imposing partial restriction on the market is likely to be beneficial for
social welfare.
4.2 Related Literature
This paper relates to the literature concerning about the behavior of media outlets
with reputational concerns, regulations on media ownership, media capture and me-
dia power, and the impact of biased media.
3Londons monopoly newspaper biased in mayoral coverage, report shows.
https://www.gold.ac.uk/news/mayoral-election-coverage-bias/
4Trump claims Washington Post is ‘lobbyist’ for Amazon. http://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/381089-trump-claims-washington-post-is-lobbyist-for-amazon
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In political economy literature, there are analyses on the behavior of media outlets
with reputational concerns, for example, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Ashworth
and Shotts (2010), and Sheen (2019), but there lacks a formal analysis on impact of
the availability of reputational information. In other words, the existing literature
only regards reputation per se as a goal, instead of treating reputation as a tool
or a valuable characteristic for the media to achieve their ultimate objectives, such
as maximizing profit or influencing public opinion. In this paper I study a game
theoretical model to investigate this important question.
I adopt the model originally proposed by Tadelis (1999, 2002). The key differences
between this paper and Tadelis (1999, 2002) are: 1. this paper is the first application
of his model in media political economy, and 2. this paper provides social welfare
evaluations and policy implications that are not the focus of Tadelis (1999, 2002).
Moreover, Tadelis (1999, 2002) focuses on non-existence of good-type-only equilib-
rium in the long run(three or more periods). In this paper, considering the nature of
the media market, I focus on a two-period case, and show the conditions for the non-
existence of good-type-only equilibrium. That is, I show that provision of reputation
per se could not eliminate the low-quality media from the market even in the short
run.
Media ownership and concentration is considered as a determining factor of the
well-functioning of democracies. The debate on regulations of media market has a
long tradition across social sciences (see Baker, 2007, Downing, 2011). In political
economy literature, Anderson and McLaren (2012) analyze media mergers and con-
tend that reasonable regulation on media merger is desirable in protection of the
benefit from diversity of reports. This paper introduces a new theoretical framework
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to analyze media mergers and acquisition motivated by political considerations, eval-
uates the impact of reputation on the media market, and assess the effect of potential
market regulations on social welfare.
This paper also contributes to the literature on media capture and media power
(Besley and Prat, 2006; Prat, 2017), and consumer behavior in a competitive news
market (Sobbrio, 2014). This paper argues that exerting influence on consumers
information by media ownership is not only a feasible strategy in autocracies (see
Gehlbach and Sonin, 2007), it is possible even in a competitive media market through
obscure ownership rule. Moreover, providing the audience reputational information
is not likely to eliminate the existence of biased media outlets. This paper argues that,
while banning all the transactions of media ownerships may not be socially optimal,
imposing partial restriction on the market is likely to be beneficial for social welfare.
This paper also connects to recent research focusing on assessing the impact of
biased media on public opinion. Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) show that the audience
that are not very familiar with political biases of media outlets can be influenced by
the slanted media. Wolton (2019) argues that the audience do not need to be unaware
of the media bias to be influenced, and biased media are not necessarily bad for
democracy. In psychological research, Pennycook and Rand (2018) finds that people
are susceptible to fake news due to lazy thinking, this paper argues that even a perfect
rational ant not lazy Bayesian could be persuaded by fake news that is spread from
a reputable outlet. This is particularly true for those who are not very well informed
about political information and media quality, and this type of citizens are essentially
the majority in most societies.
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4.3 Model Setup
I study the reputational effect by analysing an adverse-selection model proposed by
Tadelis (1999). The model has 2 periods.5 The actors are: a continuum of editorial
teams and a continuum of short-lived citizens C in each period. It can be understood
as citizens require information from the media to make decisions in different periods.
The editorial teams operate newspapers and the citizens want to make decisions after
learning information from the newspapers.6
In this overlapping generation model, there are three generations. Some editorial
teams will retire from the economy at some point and some new players will want to
enter the market. To ensure that the number of editorial teams is constant, I assume
that there is a measure 1 of the teams (one generations) that will operate for two
periods, and in each period, there is also a measure 1 of teams (two generations) that
will only operate for one period, and thus the total measure of teams is 2 throughout
the game (illustrated as Figure 4.1).
Generation 0
Generation 1
Generation 2
t = 1 t = 2
Figure 4.1: Generations of the Editorial Teams
There are two types of editorial teams, good or bad, τ ∈ {G, B}. The proportion
5For the media market, transactions do not occur frequently, and hence a two-period model is
rather suitable for our purpose. However, it may be still interesting to consider what will change if the
game is of a longer time horizon. Tadelis (1999) discusses the possibility and shows that there is no
equilibrium that only good-type buyers can successfully purchase reputable names. In other words,
a rather pessimistic result arises in a longer timeframe. This is however not the focus of the present
paper.
6I call the media outlets newspapers, but the analysis applies to other information sources such as
TV channels.
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for the editorial teams to be of good-type is γ. Only the newspapers run by the good-
type teams are able to provide correct information to their readers. The bad-type
exploit the trust from their readers. For example, they want to persuade their readers
to make decisions that serve for their own political agenda. Suppose the state of the
world is ωt ∈ [0, 1]. The probability of the good-type providing correct information
is Pr(njt = ωt) = PG and that of the bad-type is PB, and without loss of generality, I
assume that 1 > PG > PB = 0. It means that the bad-type newspapers cannot refrain
from misleading the readers (maybe because they care a lot about the issue), and
the good-type newspapers sometimes commit mistakes.7 Suppose there are more
readers than editorial teams (and thus newspapers), and hence the newspapers are
operating in a competitive market. A market of newspaper ownerships is created as
some editorial teams retire after the first period.
The number of readers is constant in each period. As in Tadelis (1999), it is as-
sumed that the readers are on the long side of the market.
At the very beginning of the game, the editorial teams establish their own news-
papers and report news. As in Baron (2006), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Anderson
and McLaren (2012) and many other papers, readers read newspapers and then make
(private) decisions guided by the newspapers. The readers are Bayesians. However
because of limited capability and willingness in information acquisition (as in Bern-
hardt et al. 2008, Duggan and Martinelli 2011, Gehlbach and Sonin 2014), they are
not well-informed about politics nor very interested in it. Hence each reader only
reads one newspaper. A reader enjoys a payoff normalized to 1 if a correct decision
(ait = ωt) is made, and if the decision is wrong, the payoff is 0. At the end of the
7In reality, the difference between the good- and bad-type editors should be less dramatic, and
hence the public are even less likely to differentiate them from their behavior.
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first period, either the readers or some organizations aggregate the information of
the newspapers’ reporting performances, and the reputational record of the media is
publicized to every actor.
In the following period, the Generation-0 teams retire and can sell their established
newspapers. The Generation-1 editorial teams can decide to rename the newspa-
pers, purchase the brands from the Generation-0 teams, or simply continue operating
the newspapers; the Generation-2 editorial teams can establish new newspapers or
takeover the newspapers operated by the Generation-0 teams.
It is assumed that all of these activities are not observable by the readers in each
period.8 What the readers know is the previous reporting performance, denoted as h,
i.e., whether a newspaper provides correct information at Period 1. A history consists
of three possible records for each period denoted as {S, F, N}. S means the report
was correct, F means the reports was wrong, and N means the newspaper is just
established or renamed, and thus without performance record.
After the transactions, the newspapers report information. The readers again learn
information from the chosen newspapers and make decisions. Then the payoffs are
realized.
A reader Rit’s problem is to select a newspaper j in order to maximize
URit = 1{a
i
t = ωt},
which is the utility from making a correct decision.
Assume that the utility of each period is not discounted, the overall payoff to a
newspaper j is:
8The results will hold as long as the observability is not perfect and free.
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UN j =

f (W j1) +V, for Generation 0
f (W j1) + f (W
j
2)−V, for Generation 1
f (W j2)−V, for Generation 2.
W jt is the reputation of the newspaper j at time t, which is the probability that the
newspaper can provide correct information Pr(njt = ωt) to the reader. f (W
j
t ) is
a function that maps reputation to profit, and V is the price of a reputable name.
f (W jt ) can be any strictly increasing function; for simplicity, in the baseline analysis,
I assume that f (W jt ) = W
j
t . The general case is discussed in Section 4.7.
The timing of this game can be summarized as follows:
1. At the beginning of t = 1, the Generation-0 and Generation-1 editorial teams es-
tablish newspapers and report news
2. Each reader purchases a newspaper and makes a decision ai1
3. Newspapers records are publicised, Generation-0 teams retire, and t = 1 ends
4. At the beginning of t = 2, the Generation-1 editorial teams can decide to rename
the newspapers, purchase the names from the Generation-0 teams, or simply con-
tinue operating the newspapers; the Generation-2 editorial teams can establish new
newspapers or takeover the newspapers operated by the Generation-0 teams
5. The newspapers report news
6. Each reader selects a newspaper and makes a decision ai2
7. The payoffs are realized and the game ends.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). In addition to un-
derstanding the equilibrium strategies of the actors, we are interested in the compo-
sition of media market after transactions of ownership. The equilibrium allocation of
the names in the society is characterized based on Rational-Expectations Equilibrium
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of an overlapping generation model. An equilibrium allocation is supported by the
following parameters and it is assumed that the actors can correctly expect them: φ
denotes the proportion of good-type of Generation 1 that failed at t = 1 subsequently
purchase S names at t = 2; ψ is the proportion of bad-type of Generation 1 that suc-
cessfully buy the S names; δ is the proportion of the good-type new entrants that buy
the S names, and ρ is that for the bad-type new entrants. In Section 4.6, I discuss the
consequence when the public mistakenly expect the allocation of good names.
4.4 Analysis
At the beginning of t = 1, W j1 is the same for all newspapers because all of them are
just created, and thus W j1 = γPG for both good and bad types.
The readers choose a newspaper depending on the reputation of the newspapers,
i.e. the probability that the newspaper can provide correct information Pr(njt = ωt) to
the reader. Hence, at the first period, because all the newspaper seem to be the same
to the readers, each of them selects a newspaper randomly. When the reputations of
newspapers vary, a reader selects a newspaper ramdomly from those with highest
reputation.
If no trade is allowed, only the good-type editorial teams can provide correct
information to the readers, and therefore in all the following periods newspapers
with a S record are of good quality, and the readers can make optimal purchasing
decision by learning the reporting histories of the papers. To be competitive in the
market, all newspapers have to build up their own reputation, and in the extreme
case as shown in this model, only the good-type editorial teams are capable of doing
so. Hence to address a purely adverse selection problem, it seems socially optimal to
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prohibit all transactions of ownerships, but in most countries, it is usually not possible
to ban all this kinds of transactions, and it is also not optimal once moral hazard is
involved (discussed in Section 4.8). In this section I discuss the social implications
of an entirely free market of reputation. Section 4.5 discusses what if the market is
partially restricted.
When reputation is tradable, there is no equilibrium without transaction of the
name, because otherwise a good reputation perfectly signals the quality of the edito-
rial teams, and hence, the newspapers with good names can charge higher price. This
creates an incentive for those without good records, such as interest groups that just
enter the media market, to purchase the names from the retired operators. Moreover,
as a newspaper with a better reputation is also with a larger readership, it is in a
better position to manipulate the electorate (Kennedy and Prat, 2018).
Proposition 4.4.1. The ownerships of newspapers with successful records will be traded in
all equilibrium.
When purchases by both existing teams and new entrants are allowed, we can
solve for the rational expectations equilibrium by equating the supply and demand of
the S names. The supply are those newspapers with S names operated by Generation
0 (γPG) and the buyers of the names are those failed to obtain the S records on their
own at t = 1 and those new entrants at t = 2, formally, φaγ(1− PG) + ψa(1− γ) +
δaγ+ ρa(1− γ). Recall that φa denotes the proportion of good-type of Generation 1
that failed at t = 1 subsequently purchase S names at t = 2; ψa is the proportion of
bad-type of Generation 1 that successfully buy the S names; δa is the proportion of
the good-type new entrants that buy the S names, and ρa is that for the bad-type new
entrants. The superscript “a” stands for “all” as every willing buyer can enter the
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market.
The market-clearing condition is therefore:
γPG = φaγ(1− PG) + ψa(1− γ) + δaγ+ ρa(1− γ). (4.1)
In a competitive market, the premium from a good reputation equals the price of
the name. That is, all the potential buyers bid for the names available on the market
with the equilibrium price.
We first calculate the rational expected posterior beliefs for a newspaper being
operated by a good-type editorial team when it is with S record and without past
record9 respectively as follows:
Pra(G|S) = γPG + φ
aγ(1− PG) + δaγ
2γPG
=
PG + φa(1− PG) + δa
2PG
and,
Pra(G|N) = (1− φ
a)γ(1− PG) + (1− δa)γ
(1− φa)γ(1− PG) + (1− φa)(1− γ) + (1− δa)γ+ (1− ρa)(1− γ)
=
2γ− γPG − φaγ(1− PG)− δaγ
2− 2γPG .
At the beginning of t = 2, the price of the reputation of a newspaper with a S
record is
Va = W2(G|S)−W2(G|N)
= (Pra(G|S)− Pra(G|N)) ∗ PG
=
PG + φa + δa − φaPG − 2γPG
1− γPG .
9All those with with a bad record in the first period will change their names to erase their failures
if they are not able to purchase the names with good records because Pr(G|N) = γ > Pr(G|F) =
γ(1−PG)
γ(1−PG)+(1−γ) when no one changes its name.
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When only the bad-type purchase the S names, once γ > 12 , the price of the good
reputation is 0. That means when there are more likely to have high-quality editorial
teams in each generation and the bad-type are very competitive in the market of
names, the names become meaningless. However, as suggested in Proposition 1, in
every equilibrium there should still be transactions of names, otherwise, a name with
S record will again turn to have positive value as it is a perfect indicator of quality
when there is no trade in expectation.
Proposition 4.4.2. The equilibrium price of reputation is
Va = max{0, PG + φ
a + δa − φaPG − 2γPG
1− γPG }.
From comparative statics of Va, it is clear that when higher proportion of good-
type buyers successfully purchase the names, the price is higher. On the other hand
when the editorial teams are more likely to be of good-type, the price is lower, because
of less scarcity of the good teams.
Corollary 4.4.1. The equilibrium price Va increases in φa and δa and decreases in γ.
Following any reasonable allocation rule that is not explicitly modelled here, some
of the buyers successfully acquire the reputable names. Those Generation-0 editorial
teams that failed in the first period and fail to acquire the good names instead rename
their old newspaper, mimicking the new entrants that also fail to acquire the good
names.
There are multiple equilibria. In equilibria with PG >
φa+δa
1+φa , there are some
reputable names are acquired by the bad types. A numerical example is when
φa = δa = 0.2, and PG > 13 . Hence we know provision of reputational informa-
tion per se does not guarantee the elimination of low-quality editorial teams from the
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market.
4.5 Market Restrictions
Considering the public goods nature of the media, countries worldwide impose var-
ious regulations on this industry. For example, in the UK, the Communications Act
2003 requires the government to maintain a sufficient media plurality and media
mergers “may be subject to intervention on media public interest grounds.”10 In this
section, I first motivate why providing reputational information could sometimes
lead to problematic outcomes, and then analyse the potential impact of market reg-
ulations. The analysis shows that although many people think that the problem of
low-quality reporting is at least partially caused by the low entry barrier of the media
market, encouraging pluralism (allowing purchases of the established media outlet
by new entrants) could be more beneficial for the society than allowing only mergers
and acquisitions by the existing players.
Why ignorance could be bliss
As shown in the previous section, the public awareness of newspaper reputation
motivates interest groups to purchase good names. We can thus evaluate whether
the provision of reputational information is unconditionally beneficial by comparing
the public welfare with and without the information.
Without knowing the reputational information, the readers choose newspapers
as when at the first period, the probability for them to select a good newspaper
is Pr(G) = γ. After learning the reputational information and the transactions of
media ownership settled, the probability for a reader to select a good newspaper
10Current Legal and Regulatory Context of Media Plurality, the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/ldcomm/120/12013.htm
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becomes Pra(G|S) = PG+φa(1−PG)+δa2PG . Comparing the two probabilities, we know that
once PG(2γ − 1) > φa(1− PG) + δa, the probability of selecting a good newspaper
becomes lower after the public is provided with the reputational information. This
means, if the media environment is already sufficiently good at the beginning (γ >
1
2 ), provision of reputational information could lower social welfare unless a good
proportion of the good names are purchased by good editorial teams. It is also worth
noting that, after provided with the reputational information and the interest groups
are motivated to purchase the good names, ignoring media reputation, i.e., selecting a
newspaper randomly, is not going to be beneficial to the public, because by doing so,
the probability for them to select a good newspaper will be further lower, decreasing
from PG+φ
a(1−PG)+δa
2PG
to PG+φ
a(1−PG)+δa
2 .
Proposition 4.5.1. Provision of the reputational information decreases the probability for a
reader to select a good newspaper if PG(2γ− 1) > φa(1− PG) + δa.
This result suggests that provision of the reputational information about the news-
papers could be detrimental to the public, and to avoid this negative outcome, the
government needs to implement some regulations to ensure φa(1− PG)+ δa > PG(1−
γ). That is, some regulations need to be applied in order to have sufficient good ed-
itorial teams successfully purchasing the good names. We first discuss the effects of
some entry barriers.
Only purchases by old teams allowed
When only the old players in the market are allowed to purchase the retiring news-
papers, the market-clearing condition is:
γPG = φoγ(1− PG) + ψo(1− γ). (4.2)
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The posterior beliefs are:
Pro(G|S) = γPG + φ
oγ(1− PG)
2γoPG
=
PG + φo(1− PG)
2PG
and,
Pro(G|N) = (1− φ
o)γ(1− PG) + γ
(1− φo)γ(1− PG) + (1− φo)(1− γ) + 1
=
2γ− γPG − φoγ+ φoγPG
2− 2γPG .
At the beginning of t = 2, the price of the reputation of a newspaper with S record
is
Vo = (Pro(G|S)− Pro(G|N)) ∗ PG = PG + φ
o − φoPG − 2γPG
1− γPG .
The superscript “o” stands for “old” as only old teams are eligible to buy the names.
Only purchases by new entrants allowed
On the other hand, when only new entrants to the market are allowed to purchase
the retiring newspapers, the corresponding market-clearing condition is:
γPG = δnγ+ ρn(1− γ). (4.3)
As before, we can calculate the posterior beliefs as follows:
Prn(G|S) = γPG + δ
nγ
2γPG
=
PG + δn
2PG
and,
Prn(G|N) = γ(1− PG) + (1− δ
n)γ
γ(1− PG) + (1− γ) + (1− δn)γ+ (1− ρn)(1− γ)
=
2γ− γPG − δnγ
2− 2γPG .
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At the beginning of t = 2, the price of the reputation of a newspaper with S record
is
Vn = (Prn(G|S)− Prn(G|N)) ∗ PG = PG + δ
n − 2γPG
1− γPG .
The superscript “n” stands for “new” as only new entrants are eligible to buy the
names.
Social welfare evaluation
Because of the multiplicity of equilibria, as Tadelis (1999: 556) argues, it is almost nat-
ural to find some way of selecting the equilibrium in which only good types bought
the names. Similarly, it is also possible to select an equilibrium in favor of the bad
types. Hence, I evaluate the social welfare by comparing the best and worst equilibria
under the three scenarios. The benchmark for comparison is the proportion of the
good-type among the newspapers with S record (2γPG). In other words, I consider
whether it is possible to achieve market clearing by only the good-type editorial teams
or by the bad-type ones in the three cases. When the proportion of the newspapers
operated by the good-type editorial teams increases, the people are more likely to
make correct decisions based on the information they acquire, and hence the social
welfare increases subsequently.
Considering the case without market restriction, the market is cleared by only the
good types when φa(1− PG) + δa = PG, and by only the bad types when ψa + ρa =
γPG
1−γ . As the former condition is feasible in all values of PG, we know that the market
of names can be cleared by only the good types. On the other hands, as both ψa and
ρa are in [0, 1], the bad types can clear the market when PG2 <
1−γ
γ .
Following the same process, we know that when only purchase by old teams is
allowed, the market can be cleared by the good types when PG < 12 and the bad types
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when PG <
1−γ
γ . When only purchase by new entrants is allowed the market can
always be cleared by the good types and can be cleared only by the bad types when
PG <
1−γ
γ .
This analysis shows, as summarized in Table 4.1, that when only purchases by
old teams are allowed, there is an undersupply of the good-type editorial teams, so
even when we want to apply some sort of selection mechanism to clear the market
by only the good types, it is unachievable. This is possible for the other two cases,
but a further advantage of the “only purchases by new entrants allowed” case is that
there are fewer bad types in the market, so it is more unlikely that all the names
are purchased by them. Hence, the worst equilibrium in the third case is better than
that in the first case. Thus we can conclude that imposing restriction on mergers and
acquisitions may increase the likelihood for achieving preferable outcomes.
Table 4.1: Comparing the market clearing conditions
By only the good-type By only the bad-type
No restriction Always if PG2 <
1−γ
γ
Only purchases by old teams allowed if PG < 12 if PG <
1−γ
γ
Only purchases by new entrants allowed Always if PG <
1−γ
γ
Proposition 4.5.2. If social welfare is evaluated by the the proportion of the good-type among
the newspapers with S record (Pr(G|S)), allowing only purchases by new entrants yields the
best potential outcome.
4.6 Scrutiny of Ownership Transactions
An appropriate institution design reduces the probability of having an undesirable
equilibrium, but a large part of equilibrium-selecting relies on the scrutiny process
underlying the media ownership transaction process. If transactions of media owner-
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ship are subject to careful scrutiny by an independent and benevolent agency, ideally,
the public will be able to enjoy a high quality media environment. Many countries
have set up this kind of institutions, such as Federal Communications Commission in
the US, but we should realistically expect that it is not possible to avoid all potentially
scandalous acquisitions. Overall, the review should focus on avoiding type 2 error:
buyers with suspicious background should be barred.
Also the public may overestimate or underestimate the capacity and quality of
governmental screening. I denote the former as δ˜ > δ or φ˜ > φ, and the latter δ˜ < δ
or φ˜ < φ. When the public overestimate the quality of governmental scrutiny, there
will be: 1. more bad-type newspapers than the public believe, and 2. the price of
good names will be higher. While the former will be detrimental to social welfare
for sure, the latter concerning about the resource available to and the origin of profits
for the name buyers, and hence the effect is rather ambiguous. I discuss about the
relationship between price and social welfare in Section 4.7.
4.7 Discussion on the Media’s Payoff Structure
Price of the newspaper ownership determines the potential buyers of the reputable
names. Higher price could select a wrong group of buyers for several reasons. If
those with bad intent are more resourceful, higher price would only be affordable for
them. The problem can be addressed if governmental scrutiny functions properly,
but will be very problematic if it is not.
Moreover, as reputation maps to benefits for newspaper owners, it is important to
understand where is the main source of the returns: whether economic or political?
In the baseline analysis, it is assumed that f (W jt ) = W
j
t for simplicity. However, f (W
j
t )
111
can be any strictly increasing function in reputation W jt . For example, it can be that
for the good-type the return from reputation is f G(W jt ) = f
G
E (W
j
t ), which is purely
from economic benefit. For the bad-type, the return from reputation is f B(W jt ) =
f BE (W
j
t ) + f
B
P (W
j
t ), the first term being the economic return and the latter political.
Economic returns include revenue from newspaper selling and advertising. Political
returns can be material or immaterial rent that only owners with own political agenda
can enjoy, such as income from governmental advertising, readership from partisan
audience (as in Bernhardt et al., 2008), or because newspapers successfully influence
readers’ decisions. If the rent from reputation consists predominantly of political
benefit, buying a name is an effective and essentially a cheap way of affecting the
public opinion, and the readers will be likely to subject to political manipulation.11
If this is the case, only those with access to non-economic rents have incentive to
buy the names, and the names are no longer profitable for good-type editorial teams
to acquire. Such a case is socially worrisome, and hence maintaining f GE (W
j
t ) >
f BE (W
j
t ) + f
B
P (W
j
t ) is crucial, yet not always possible.
4.8 Considering Moral Hazard
A change in the behaviour of the bad-type editorial teams enables us to analyse the
case with both adverse selection and moral hazard. In this extension, as in Tadelis
(2002), the bad types can decide whether to exert effort in reporting. The accuracy of
their reports is a function of the levels of effort. Formally, the accuracy is PB = ePG
and the cost of making effort is c(e). It is further assumed that c′(e) > 0, c′′(·) > 0,
11For example in Hungary, the son of Mr. Orbans former finance minister purchased leading news
website, Origo. According to a New York Times report titled “The Website That Shows How a Free
Press Can Die”, before the purchase, “Origo had struggled financially. Now it was flush with govern-
ment advertising revenue, which more than tripled after the sale.” https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
11/24/world/europe/hungary-viktor-orban-media.html
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and c(0) = 0.
With this setup, it is clear that the existence of market of reputation can incentivize
the retiring bad-type editorial teams to report news with effort. When without the
market (because of total market restriction or perfect observability of transactions),
the bad types of Generation 0 and Generation 2 will not exert any effort as they
have “no future” when making decisions. Hence, at t = 1, only the bad types of
Generation 1 have incentive to exert effort, and the expected value of information is
W1 = [γ + 12(1− γ)e]PG. On the other hand, if there is a market of names, all of
the bad types will exert effort and thus the expected value of information is W1 =
[γ+ (1− γ)e]PG.
When allowing trading of names, more editorial teams would exert effort than
when there is no market, but the equilibrium level of effort may decrease as more
teams are willing to exert effort, and hence it is now harder to differentiate types of
teams by their names. Therefore, the social welfare evaluation depends on the specific
cost function chosen (Tadelis, 2002: 869). Overall we know that, unlike in the adverse
selection model, banning the transaction of names could be socially detrimental.
Proposition 4.8.1. When considering the problem of moral hazard, banning all transactions
in the market of reputation may not be socially optimal as when concerning only about the
problem of adverse selection.
4.9 Concluding Remarks
Nowadays, many argue that the problem of low-quality news reporting can be ad-
dressed by providing the public with the reputational information regarding the me-
dia. In this paper, I study a stylised model to evaluate the impact of reputation on
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media power and discuss the social welfare implications of different types of market
restrictions and scrutiny. This framework points out that, instead of being a cure to
the problem of low quality reporting, media reputation itself can be a source of con-
cern about political manipulation. The model is particularly suitable for analysing
an economy consisting of many media outlets and a significant proportion of them
is operated by new entrants. The analysis indicates that when the readers know the
reputation of newspapers, a market of names (reputation) is created naturally. When
the market faces only adverse selection problem, forbidding all transactions of names
is the first-best option. If that is not feasible, allowing only mergers and acquisitions
by new entrants could deliver most preferable social welfare outcomes than no re-
striction or allowing only mergers and acquisitions by old teams. If moral hazard
is involved, banning all transactions may be no longer socially optimal as the pre-
mium from a name with good reputation can incentivise the newspapers to produce
high-quality reports. Overall, I argue that reputation information can make some
newspapers more influential than the others and this leads to a need for institutional
and governmental interventions on transactions of media ownership.
There are other related issues not discussed in this paper worth future investiga-
tion. For example, we need to consider what means “high-quality” journalism. In the
model of this paper, it is ex post clear that the bad-type media outlets will always re-
port low-quality news, but in reality they can employ more subtle reporting strategies
to manipulate news and can preserve their to reputation for a longer period. Such
strategies include focusing on national or global news instead of local news (George
and Waldfogel, 2006) or disguising biased reporting in the name of balance report-
ing (Sharpiro, 2016). These strategies lead to public ignorance on certain issues, and
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further complicate the relationship between reputation and good journalism. Also, it
is clear in the analysis that governmental scrutiny of media ownership transactions
could be helpful in ruling out purchase proposals by the bad teams. However, if
the interest groups apply a strategy short than direct ownership to compromise the
editorial teams, for example the Chinese government pays internationally respected
newspapers such as Daily Telegraph in the UK to include propaganda supplements
in their publications,12 then it is hard for democratic governments to intervene this
practice due to the promise of free press. How to address this issue remains a critical
question for future research.
12Inside China’s audacious global propaganda campaign. https://www.theguardian.com/news/
2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping
115
Bibliography
[1] Allcott, Hunt, and Matthew Gentzkow. 2017. “Social Media and Fake News in the
2016 Election.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 31 (2): 211-236.
[2] Anderson, Simon P., and John McLaren. 2012. “Media Mergers and Media Bias
with Rational Consumers.” Journal of the European Economic Association 10 (4): 831-
859.
[3] Ashworth, Scott, and Kenneth W. Shotts. 2010. “Does Informative Media Com-
mentary Reduce Politicians’ Incentives to Pander?.” Journal of Public Economics 94
(11-12): 838-847.
[4] Baker, C. Edwin. 2007. Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[5] Baron, David. 2006. “Persistent Media Bias.” Journal of Public Economics 90 (1-2):
1-36.
[6] Bernhardt, Dan, Stefan Krasa, and Mattias Polborn. 2008. “Political Polarization
and The Electoral Effects of Media Bias.” Journal of Public Economics 92: 1092-1104.
[7] Besley, Timothy, and Andrea Prat. 2006. “Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand?:
Media Capture and Government Accountability.” American Economic Review 96
(3): 720-736.
116
[8] Downing, John D. H.. 2011. “Media Ownership, Concentration, and Control: The
Evolution of Debate.” The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications Ed.
Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa. Oxford: Blackwell Publish-
ing Ltd.
[9] Duggan, John, and Cesar Martinelli. 2011. “A Spatial Theory of Media Slant and
Voter Choice.” The Review of Economic Studies 78 (2): 640-666.
[10] Durante, Ruben, and Brian Knight. 2012. “Partisan Control, Media Bias, and
Viewer Responses: Evidence from Berlusconi’s Italy.” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association 10 (3): 451-481.
[11] Gehlbach, Scott, and Konstantin Sonin. 2014. “Government Control of the Me-
dia.” Journal of Public Economics 118: 163-171.
[12] George, Lisa M., and Joel Waldfogel. 2006. “The “New York Times” and the
Market for Local Newspapers.” The American Economic Review 96(1): 435-447.
[13] Gentzkow, Matthew, and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2006. “Media Bias and Reputation.”
Journal of Political Economy 114 (2): 280-316.
[14] Kennedy, Patrick and Andrea Prat. 2018. “Where Do People Get Their News?.”
Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-65.
[15] Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982. “Reputation and Imperfect Informa-
tion.” Journal of Economic Theory 27 (2): 253-279.
[16] Lim, Chloe. 2018. “Checking How Fact-checkers Check.” Research and Politics
July- September: 1-8.
117
[17] Martin, Gregory J., and Josh McCrain. 2019. “Local News and National Politics.”
American Political Science Review 113 (2): 372- 384.
[18] Ngok, Ma. 2007. “State–Press Relationship in Post-1997 Hong Kong: Constant
Negotiation amidst Self-Restraint.” The China Quarterly 192 (December): 949-970.
[19] Nyhan, Brendan, and Jason Reifler. 2010. “When Corrections Fail: The Persis-
tence of Political Misperceptions.” Political Behavior 32: 303-330.
[20] Pennycook, Gordon, and David G. Rand. 2018. “Lazy, Not Biased: Susceptibility
to Partisan Fake News Is Better Explained by Lack of Reasoning Than by Moti-
vated Reasoning.” Cognition forthcoming.
[21] Prat, Andrea. 2015. “Media Capture and Media Power.” In Simon P. Anderson,
Joel Waldfogel, and David Stromberg (Eds.). Handbook of Media Economics Vol. 1b.
North Holland.
[22] Prat, Andrea. 2017. “Media Power.” Journal of Political Economy forthcoming.
[23] Shapiro, Jesse M.. 2014. “Special Interests and the Media: Theory and An Appli-
cation to Climate Change.” Journal of Public Economics 144: 91-108.
[24] Sheen, Greg Chih-Hsin. 2019. “Media with Reputational Concerns: Yes Men or
Watchdogs?.” Working Paper
[25] Sobbrio, Francesco. 2014. “Citzen-Editors’ Endogenous Information Acquisition
and News Accuracy.” Journal of Public Economics 113: 43-53.
[26] Tadelis, Steven. 1999. “What’s in a Name? Reputation as a Tradeable Asset.”
American Economic Review 89 (3): 548-563.
118
[27] Tadelis, Steven. 2002. “The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism.”
Journal of Political Economy 110 (4): 854-882.
[28] Wolton, Stephane. 2019. “Are Biased Media Bad for Democracy?.” American Jour-
nal of Political Science forthcoming.
119
Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.4.1
The lemma is proved directly from Bayes’ Rule. Given γ > γ and the media outlet
reports truthfully, Pr(τG = h|r = x) ≥ p ≥ Pr(τG = h|r 6= x) always holds. Pr(τG =
h|r = x) ≥ p ≥ Pr(τG = h|r 6= x) only occurs, given γ > γ, when the media
outlet reports truthfully. When solving for (1) ≥ p and p ≥ (2), γ is cancelled out
everywhere. Thus Pr(τG = h|r = x) ≥ p ≥ Pr(τG = h|r 6= x) is independent of the
value of γ. As weakly dominated strategies are ruled out, the only strategy that can
provide informative report to the voter is the truthful reporting strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
For the truthful equilibrium to sustain, the condition is that when sMJ = x, Pr(τ
M =
h|r = x) ≥ Pr(τM = h|r 6= x), and when sMJ 6= x, Pr(τM = h|r 6= x) ≥ Pr(τM = h|r =
x). That is, when the media receiving signal sMJ = x, there is no profitable deviation
for it to report r 6= x, and vice versa. Thus the necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of a truthful equilibrium is:
q(1− µE(γ))
q(1− µE(γ)) + (1− q)(1− µE(γ)) =
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ . (A.1)
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Simple algebra yields that this equation can hold only if q = 0, q = 1 or µ = µ.
When these three situations do not occur, it is always profitable for M to report
r = x as
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ >
q(1− µE(γ))
q(1− µE(γ)) + (1− q)(1− µE(γ)) .
This result means being “yes man” is a weakly dominant strategy for the media
outlet. Hence even the competent media outlet does not report truthfully.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
To analyze the general case, we need to find the posteriors corresponding to different
actions when ρ = 1 and when ρ = 0. We find the posteriors when ρ = 1 with the
similar procedure as in the previous case. Recall that sMJ = x only when x = ω
because the probability that the media outlet and the government both receive the
same wrong signal is 0 (Caillaud and Tirole, 2002). In other words, the case sV =
ω 6= {sMJ = x} is ruled out. That means Pr(sV = sMJ = x = ω|sMJ = x) = 1.
Suppose truthful reporting, then the posterior for V about M after observing r = x
is again
Pr(τM = h|r = x) = qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ . (A.2)
When the media outlet receives sMJ = x, it has no incentive to deviate away from
reporting r = x, so to check the existence of a truthful equilibrium, we only need
to consider whether, when the media outlet receiving sMJ 6= x, there is a profitable
deviation from reporting r 6= x to r = x.
Suppose the actors follow truthful equilibrium, and the probability ρ that the
voter receives a private signal sV = ω is 1, when r 6= x, there are three possible
relations of {ω, x, sMJ , sV} could happen: sV = ω = sMJ 6= x, sV = ω = x 6= sMJ , and
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sV = ω 6= r 6= x.
The posterior beliefs about the type of M after observing each of the above rela-
tions are as follows:
1. If the media report is correct while the government decision is wrong:
Pr(τM = h|sV = ω = sMJ 6= x) =
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ ;
2. If the government decision is correct and the media report is wrong:
Pr(τM = h|sV = ω = x 6= sMJ ) =
q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ;
3. If both the government decision and the media report are wrong:
Pr(τM = h|sV = ω 6= sMJ 6= x) =
q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) .
For a competent media outlet, the probability for the first relation to occur is
(1− E(γ))µ; for the second relation to occur is E(γ)(1− µ); for the third relation to
occur is (1− E(γ))(1− µ).
Thus the posterior belief Pr(τM = h|r 6= x) supposing truthful equilibrium is:
(1− E(γ))µ( qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ ) + E(γ)(1− µ)(
q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ) + (1− E(γ))(1− µ)(
q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ). (A.3)
Recall that if the media outlet is caught cheating, the voter believes it is incompe-
tent (Pr(τM = h|sV = ω 6= (r = x)) = 0), thus when the competent media deviates
from truthful reporting, the posterior belief Pr(τM = h|r = x) is:
[(1− E(γ))µ]0+ E(γ)(1− µ)( qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ ) + [(1− E(γ))(1− µ)]0. (A.4)
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Solving for (A.3) ≥ (A.4), we have the inequality (A.5) as the condition for the
competent media to adopt the truth-reporting strategy:
(1− µ)( q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ) ≥ (E(γ)− µ)(
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ ). (A.5)
Given µ ≥ E(γ), the LHS of (A.5) is positive; while the RHS of (A.5) is negative, the
condition always holds.
Thus we can conclude that a competent media outlet has no incentive to deviate
from truth-reporting when ρ = 1.
However an incompetent media outlet has incentive to deviate from truth-reporting
when ρ = 1:
The probabilities for sV = ω = sMJ 6= x, sV = ω = x 6= sMJ , and sV = ω 6= r 6= x to
occur are (1− E(γ))µ; E(γ)(1− µ); (1− E(γ))(1− µ). Thus the parallel condition to
(A.5) is:
(1− µ)( q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ) ≥ (E(γ)− µ)(
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ ). (A.6)
Because the RHS of (A.6) is non-negative, the condition for the incompetent media
to not deviate from the truthful equilibrium is more complicated than that for its
competent counterpart.
Rearranging (A.6) and combining it with the condition µ ≥ E(γ) ≥ µ, we have
the condition (A.7) for the incompetent media to follow the truthful equilibrium:
min{µ, q(µ− µ
2) + (1− q)(µ− µ2)
µ(1− µ) + q(µ(µ− µ)) } ≥ E(γ) ≥ µ. (A.7)
When ρ ∈ (0, 1), the condition for a competent media outlet to not deviate from
the truthful equilibrium is:
ρ[(A.3)] + (1− ρ) q(1− µE(γ))
q(1− µE(γ)) + (1− q)(1− µE(γ)) ≥ ρ[(A.4)] + (1− ρ)
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ . (A.8)
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Rearranging (A.8), we have the condition (2.5) in the main text.
Following the same procedure, we have the condition (2.6) in the main text for the
incompetent type.
Proof of Proposition 2.5.1
Two Media Outlets 1. When ρ = 0: Simple algebra shows that qµqµ+(1−q)µ is greater
or equal to both Ψ2 and
q(1−µ)
q(1−µ)+(1−q)(1−µ) when µ ≥ µ, and it is always true by
definition, unless q = 0, q = 1 or µ = µ.
2. When ρ = 1: For a competent media outlet, suppose a truthful equilibrium, the
condition for it to not deviate is A + B ≥ C, where,
A = [(1− E(γ))E(µ)µ+ E(γ)[1− E(µ)]µ+ [1− E(γ)][1− E(µ)]µ] qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ
B = [E(γ)E(µ)(1− µ) + [1− E(γ)][1− E(µ)](1− µ) + E(γ)[1− E(µ)](1− µ)
+ [1− E(γ)]E(µ)(1− µ)] q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ)
C = E(γ)(1− µ) qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ .
With some algebra, the condition becomes
(1− µ)2[qµ+ (1− q)µ] ≥ [E(γ)[1− µ+ E(µ)µ]− µ]µ[q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ)],
because E(γ)[1 − µ + E(µ)µ] − µ on the RHS is negative whenever µ ≥ E(γ), the
condition holds. Hence a competent media outlet has no incentive to deviate from
truth-reporting when ρ = 1.
For an incompetent media outlet, the parallel condition for it to follow a truthful
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equilibrium is
[µ− E(γ)E(µ)µ] qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ + (1− µ)
q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ≥ E(γ)(1− µ)
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ .
The condition can be simplified as
(1− µ) q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ≥ [E(γ)[1− µ+ E(µ)µ]− µ]
qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ .
3. The conditions for the truthful equilibrium when ρ ∈ (0, 1) are the convex combi-
nation of the above two cases, and thus we can conclude that a truthful equilibrium
does not always exist.
3 or More Media Outlets 1. qµqµ+(1−q)µ is always greater or equal to Ψn because
µ ≥ µ.
2. When ρ = 0: Consider n → ∞, an incompetent media outlet will deviate from
truthful reporting if
E(γ)(1− µ)( qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ −
q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) )−
[1− E(γ)]µ qµ
qµ+ (1− q)µ − [1− E(γ)](1− µ)
q(1− µ)
q(1− µ) + (1− q)(1− µ) ≥ 0. (A.9)
3. Simplify (A.9), we have the condition
[E(γ)− µ]µ− (1− µ)E(µ) ≥ 0
for an incompetent media outlet to deviate from truthful reporting.
4. When ρ = 1 and n→ ∞, the condition for an incompetent media outlet to deviate
from truthful reporting is again (A.9) and thus the two cases are equivalent.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
All proofs that are not derived directly from the main text are presented here.
Proof of Corollary 3.4.1
Proof. The information value when the society is unstable is derived by comparing
the expected payoffs with and without truthful reporting. That is,
Pr(m = b|m(s) = s)(−Db)− Pr(m = g|m(s) = s)(1− β)µAg Dg − (−Dg) =
Dg − (1− p− q + 2pq)Db − (p + q− 2pq)(βµAg + (1− β))Dg
The difference in information values when the society is unstable and stable is Vu −
V =
(1− (p+ q− 2pq)(βµAg +(1− β))− p)Dg− (1− p− q+ 2pq)(1− (µAb +(1−µAb )β))Db.
We first check whether (1− (p + q− 2pq)(βµAg + (1− β))− p) > 0. Suppose
(1− (p + q− 2pq)(βµAg + (1− β))− p) < 0⇒
p >
1+ q + βq
2− 2q + βq .
Because 1+q+βq2−2q+βq > 1 when q >
1
3 and given q >
1
2 by assumption, by contradiction,
we always have (1− (p + q− 2pq)(βµAg + (1− β))− p) > 0.
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Thus Vu −V > 0 when
Dg >
(1− p− q + 2pq)(1− (µAb + (1− µAb )β))Db
(1− (p + q− 2pq)(βµAg + (1− β))− p)
⇒
Dg >
(1− q)(1− p)(1+ β)Db
(1+ q + βq)− (2− 2q + βq)p .
Note that because q ∈ (12 , 1], p ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ [0, 1)
[(1+ q + βq)− (2− 2q + βq)p]− [(1− q)(1− p)(1+ β)] =
(2q− p) + (2qβ− β) + (β+ q− 2βq)p > 0⇒
Db >
(1− q)(1− p)(1+ β)Db
(1+ q + βq)− (2− 2q + βq)p
and by definition Dg > Db, the condition Dg >
(1−q)(1−p)(1+β)Db
(1+q+βq)−(2−2q+βq)p always holds. As
such we prove that the dictator is more willing to commit to no censorship when the
society is unstable than when it is stable.
B.2 Private Signal
Suppose apart from the news report, the dictator receives a private signal about the
state of the world from his viziers or internal media (see Egorov and Sonin, 2011,
Dimitrov, 2017). The dictator then decides whether to censor a negative news report.
Similar to q for the media signal, we set the precision of the dictator’s private signal
φ ∈ (12 , 1], meaning that Pr(v = g|ω = G) = Pr(v = b|ω = B) = φ. For the public,
the posteriors are still the same, but the dictator now has better knowledge about
the state of the world even without the information from the media. We denote the
posteriors for the dictator as Pr(ω = B|v, m) = µAvm, v ∈ {b, g}, m ∈ {b, g}.
If the media outlet reports truthfully, the posteriors for the government, the poste-
riors for the public and the prior will have the following relations: 1). When the
quality of the dictator’s signal is higher than the media outlet’s signal (φ > q),
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µAbb > µ
A
b > µ
A
bg > µ
A
gb > µ
A
g > µ
A
gg; 2). when the quality of the dictator’s signal
is lower than the media outlet’s signal (φ < q), µAbb > µ
A
b > µ
A
gb > µ
A
bg > µ
A
g > µ
A
gg.
We denote the damage for the dictator depending on his information as −Dvm. As
before, based on his posterior beliefs about the state of the world, the relation of
different damage levels (and also comparing to −Dg and −Db) is as follows:{
−Dgg < −Dg < −Dgb < −Dbg < −Db < −Dbb < 0 if φ > q,
−Dgg < −Dg < −Dbg < −Dgb < −Db < −Dbb < 0 if φ < q.
The expected payoff matrix for the dictator is Table B.1.
Table B.1: UA when m = b
c = 0 c = 1
v = g −µAgbDgb − (1− µAgb)βDgb −µAgbDgb − k
v = b −µAbbDbb − (1− µAbb)βDbb −µAbbDbb − k
When v = g and m = b, the commitment constraint for no censorship is:
(1− µAgb)βDgb < k. (B.1)
When v = b and m = b, the commitment constraint for no censorship is:
(1− µAbb)βDbb < k. (B.2)
Given µAb > µ
A
gb and Dgb > Db, Inequality (B.1) is more difficult to be satisfied
than Inequality (3.2). Given µAbb > µ
A
b and Db > Dbb, Inequality (B.2) is easier to be
satisfied than Inequality (3.2). Given v = g, the probability that m = b is Pr(m =
b|v = g) = φ+ pq− pφ− qφ, and given v = b, the probability that m = b is Pr(m =
b|v = b) = 1− q − φ − p + qφ + pq + pφ. The ex ante commitment constraint is a
weighted average of Inequalities (B.1) and (B.2) with the weight of Pr(s = b|v = g)
and Pr(s = b|v = b) respectively.
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Hence, when 1− q − p < 0, having private information can ease the dictator’s
commitment problem as the ex ante commitment constraint is more lenient. On the
other hand, when 1− q− p > 0, having private signal deteriorates the commitment
problem. This is because when the bad state of the world is likely to be realized,
censoring the media report is not very helpful, and the truthful information from the
media can help the dictator to prepare for the challenge. While if the media report
is likely to be a false alarm, the dictator with his private information is more likely
to censor the negative report. In other words, the dictator can choose to avoid the
immediate damage from the negative report by censorship and hopes that the report
turns out to be incorrect. When φ is approaching to 0.5, these two cases are almost
equally likely to occur, and thus the strength of commitment problem faced by the
dictator is similar to that of the baseline result.
Proposition B.2.1. Having private information can ease the dictator’s commitment problem
when 1− q− p < 0. When 1− q− p > 0, having private signal deteriorates the commitment
problem. When φ→ 0.5, these two cases are equally likely to occur.
Unless the dictator’s private signal is perfect (φ = 1), information from the media
is always valuable to the dictator.1 However, dictators are always under pressure not
only from outside but also from inside of their government. Maintaining powerful se-
cret services is not only costly but also risky. For example, the South Korean dictator
Park Chung-hee was assassinated at Korean Central Intelligence Agency by his intel-
ligence chief, Kim Jae-kyu, in 1979. Thus according to Egorov and Sonin (2011), the
1Some scholars, e.g., Dimitrov (2017), contend that the dictator’s possession of an effective internal
information channel relegates information from public media to redundancy. This argument is only
true when the internal channel provides perfect information. Formally, when φ = 1 and v = b, µAbb
and µAbg are both equal to 1, and thus learning information from the media cannot further decrease
damage, the dictator is indifferent from censoring the media or not. Whenever φ < 1, information
from public media is valuable as the dictator’s posterior belief is more accurate with one more piece
of information, as long as it is truthfully reported.
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dictators tend to employ mediocre viziers to avoid potential betrayal, and this could
mean that the quality of the private signal for the dictator should be low (φ is close
to 0.5). Moreover, even when the sources of private signals are loyal to the dictators,
it is still possible that the dictator cannot receive truthful information. An extreme
example is that the long-lived Portuguese dictator Anto´nio de Oliveira Salazar was
“died without knowing he had been replaced as Premier.”2 As such, once the actors
have to make the strategic decisions as depicted in this paper, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, the baseline result is robust when taking dictators’ private information
into account.
Another reason that a dictator cannot solely rely on his private information chan-
nel is that when he needs to convince the public that the state of the world is good
(when the society is unstable), he has to rely on media outlets that the public deem
as credible to convey this message. Even when the private signal can provide perfect
information to the dictator, that signal cannot alter the posterior of the public because
state-owned media cannot commit to report truthfully.3 Thus there is a demand for
truthful reporting from the dictator and he inevitably needs to face the commitment
problem suggested by this paper.
Proof of Proposition 5. Inequalities (B.1) and (B.2) are derived in the main text. It is also
shown in the main text that Inequality (B.1) is more difficult to hold than Inequality
(3.2), and Inequality (B.2) is easier to hold than Inequality (3.2).
2“Salazar, Ruler of Portugal for 40 Years, Dies,” New York Times, July 28, 1970. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/28/archives/
salazar-ruler-of-portugal-for-40-years-dies-salazar-dies-in-lisbon.html.
3Assume that the preference of the state-owned media is aligned with the dictator. Once the state-
owned media are believed to have reported information truthfully, they can exploit this trust to mislead
the public in order to benefit the regime. Gehlbach and Sonin (2014) investigate how the dictator can
optimally manipulate the public by an editorial policy that provides a certain amount of negative
information to make the state-controlled media trustworthy, but they do not discuss how the dictator
can adhere to this editorial policy.
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Suppose the media outlet reporting truthfully,
Pr(m = b|v = b) = Pr(ω = B)Pr(v = b|ω = B)Pr(m = b|ω = B)
+ Pr(ω = G)Pr(v = b|ω = G)Pr(m = b|ω = G)
= pqφ+ (1− p)(1− q)(1− φ)
= 1− q− φ− p + qφ+ pq + pφ;
whereas,
Pr(m = b|v = g) = Pr(ω = B)Pr(v = g|ω = B)Pr(m = b|ω = B)
+ Pr(ω = G)Pr(v = g|ω = G)Pr(m = b|ω = G)
= p(1− φ)q + (1− p)φ(1− q)
= φ+ pq− pφ− qφ.
Hence when 1− q− p− 2φ+ 2qφ+ 2pφ = (1− q− p)(1− 2φ) > 0, the dictator’s
commitment constraint is more likely to be Inequality (B.2). Given φ > 0.5, the
commitment problem is less severe when 1− q− p < 0. When 1− q− p > 0, having
private signal makes the commitment problem more severe. When φ → 0.5, (1−
q− p)(1− 2φ) → 0, and thus these two cases are equally likely to occur. Given that
(1− µAgb)βDgb > (1− µAb )βDb > (1− µAbb)βDbb, the realized commitment constraint,
which is the average of Inequalities (B.1) and (B.2) with equal weight, is close to
Inequality (3.2).
B.3 Selection Bias
The potential sample selection bias thus created can be readily captured by the fol-
lowing statistical model (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). To be consistent with the
131
notations above, denote the government’s censorship decision over message i by ci
and whether it is censored or not by mi (an indicator variable).4 They are related to
two latent variables, c◦i and m
◦
i as follows:
ci =
{
c◦i if m
◦
i > 0;
unobserved/self-censored Otherwise.
(B.3)
mi =
{
1 (truthful report) if m◦i > 0;
0 (self-censorship) Otherwise.
(B.4)
According to our theory, one’s self-censorship decision hinges critically on the dicta-
tor’s commitment ability to no censorship. As a result, c◦i and m
◦
i should be corre-
lated, and therefore we specify a joint bivariate process for their generation:[
c◦i
m◦i
]
=
[
Xiγ
Wiψ
]
+
[
ui
vi
]
,
[
ui
vi
]
∼ NID
(
0,
[
σ2 ρσ
ρσ 1
])
(B.5)
where c◦i measures the government’s censorship decision when a full sample—i.e.,
including those self-censored messages—is available, and m◦i captures an individ-
ual citizen’s (unobservable) decision to self-censor him/herself. The bivariate data-
generating process specified above allows their random components to be correlated
and normally and independently distributed (NID) with standard deviation σ and
correlation ρ.5
Xi is a vector of exogenous variables that determine the government’s decisions
over censorship. In King et al.’s (2013) language, the vector must include a major vari-
able measuring whether a message has the collective action potential or not. However,
as we have explained—and as King et al. (2013) also admit in the paragraph quoted
above— since the sample is truncated by individuals’ self-censorship (when ci = c◦i ),
estimating γ without taking m◦i into account will definitely lead to biased results.
4Let’s suppose both are observable here for the exposition purposes. Moreover, ci can either be an
indicator variable like mi, or take a more general form of a continuous variable measuring the strength
of censorship (e.g., the duration of censorship, or the number of messages deleted).
5The variance of vi is set to 1 since only the sign of m◦i can be observed.
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Through this simple model of sample selectivity, our contributions can be easily
explicated. First of all, the comparative statics derived from our theoretical model
can make it relatively easy to specify Wi for the determinants of one’s self-censorship
behavior since the commitment constraint shown in our model can all be viewed as
issue and media outlet specific. Second, from a Maximum Likelihood Estimation
perspective, this simple statistical model also allows us to derive a full log-likelihood
function.6
∑
mi=0
logΦ(−Wiψ) + ∑
mi=1
log
[
1
σ
φ(
ci − Xiγ
σ
)
]
+ ∑
mi=1
logΦ
[
Wiψ+
ρ(ci−Xiγ)
σ√
1− ρ2
]
(B.7)
For the first two terms, they are simply the log-likelihood functions for a probit (re-
garding the part choosing to self-censor themselves) and an OLS (for testing King
et al.’s (2013) hypothesis) models respectively. When ρ = 0 (i.e., the media outlet’s
self-censorship decision is not correlated with the government’s censorship decision),
γ can be estimated independently of the estimation of ψ, and the result in King et al.
(2013) is therefore unbiased even if the information about self-censorship is entirely
missing. By contrast, if ρ 6= 0 (according to our theory), the presence of the third term
implies that γ can only be estimated without bias when we know the joint distribu-
tion of the two choices—i.e., the government censorship and self-censorship. Hence,
since all the key parameters in our model such as β (correlating positively with the
penetration of media outlets), q (the quality of media outlets), and α (the perceived
probability that a report would be disliked by the dictator) are all observables, self-
censorship decision mi can be modeled as a linear combinations of them in empirical
implementation. This step then lays the very foundation for estimating consistently
6Based on the following expression for how much each observation contributes to the likelihood
function:
I(mi = 0)P(mi = 0) + I(mi = 1)P(mi = 1) f (c◦i |mi = 1) (B.6)
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both parameter vectors, γ and ψ.
Moreover, when we relax the assumption that mi is observable, more data-driven
approaches to address the unobservability of mi in estimating γ can be adopted. For
example, applying the often-used EM algorithm (Little and Rubin, 2002) to such a
typical missing data problem will require empirical researchers to evaluate the prob-
ability distribution of a relevant latent variable when taking the expectation of the
complete-data log-likelihood (the E step), given the observed data and an initial guess
of the estimand of interest, γold—i.e., P(m◦i |X,W,γold). Specifying such a conditional
probability is often a challenge in implementing an EM algorithm, but the parame-
ters derived from the comparative statics in our model let empirical researchers of
censorship solve it easily by leveraging the variations in W. 7
B.4 EM Algorithm
In reality, one’s self-censorship decision, mi, is unobservable, but this doesn’t mean
our theoretical predictions have no way to help empirical researchers better estimate
how messages’ collective action potential affects the dictator’s censorship decision
(i.e., γ). The unobservability of mi constitutes a typical missing data problem for
estimating γ, and our contribution can be readily highlighted by applying the EM
algorithm to the problem.
Assume that after the nth iteration the current estimate for γ is given by γn. Since
the objective is to maximize the log-likelihood function, L(γ), we need to compute an
updated estimate of γ such that ,
L(γ) > L(γn) (B.8)
7Please see appendix B.4 for the details about how the EM algorithm actually works to estimate γ
when the data on self-censorship are missing.
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Equivalently, we want to maximize the following difference,
L(γ)− L(γn) = ln P(Y|γ)− ln P(Y|γn) (B.9)
where Y denotes a set of complete data. It comprises of a set of observables , Y =(
X,W
)
and a hidden random vector of self-censorship m◦i . The total probability
P(Y|γ) may be written in terms of the hidden variable m◦i as,
P(Y|γ) =∑
m
P(Y|m◦i ,γ)P(m◦i |γ) (B.10)
Plugging (B.10) into (B.9) and applying Jensen’s Inequality yield:
L(γ)− L(γn) = ln
[
∑
m
P(Y|m◦i ,γ)P(m◦i |γ)
]
− ln P(Y|γn)
=∑
m
{
P(m◦i |Y,γn) ln
[
P(Y|m◦i ,γ)P(m◦i |γ)
P(m◦i |Y,γn)P(Y|γn)
]}
, ∆(γ|γn)
(B.11)
which lower-bounds the difference between the likelihood function before and after
γ is updated.
L(γ) ≥ L(γn) + ∆(γ|γn) (B.12)
Define
l(γ|γn) , L(γn) + ∆(γ|γn) (B.13)
so that the relationship in (B.11) can be made explicit as,
L(γ) ≥ l(γ|γn) (B.14)
When γ = γn, we observe that ∆(γ|γn) = 0, and therefore L(γ)− L(γn) = 0 and
L(γ) = L(γn) = l(γ|γn). Given this equality, any γ that increases l(γ|γn) will also
increase L(γ). In order to achieve the greatest possible increase in the value of L(γ),
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the EM Algorithm calls for choosing a value of γ such that l(γ|γn) is maximized. The
updated value can be denoted as γn+1. Formally, we have
γn+1 = arg max
γ
{l(γ|γn)}
= arg max
γ
{
L(γn) +∑
m
{
P(m◦i |Y,γn) ln
[
P(Y|m◦i ,γ)P(m◦i |γ)
P(m◦i |Y,γn)P(Y|γn)
]}}
= arg max
γ
{
∑
m
{P(m◦i |Y,γn) ln [P(Y, m◦i |γ)]}
}
= arg max
γ
{
Em|Y,γn [ln P(Y, m
◦
i |γ)]
}
(B.15)
The final expression reached can be anatomized by the following steps;
1. E-step: Determine the conditional expectation, Em|Y,γn
[
lnP(Y, m◦i |γ)
]
.
2. M-step: Maximize this expression with respect to γ.
As a consequence, even if the self-censored messages are missing in the sample,
using EM algorithm along with the observables suggested by our theory can still help
find an unbiased estimate for γ.
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